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I. 
LIST OF PARTIES 
The question certified to the Utah Supreme Court pertains to the following 
parties: 
1. Plaintiffs Ron Thayer and Cathie Thayer; 
2. Defendant Washington County School District. 
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III. 
STATEMENT OF CERTIFIED QUESTION 
Does UCA section 63G-7-301(5)(c), which retains immunity for "the 
issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of.. . any permit, license, certificate, 
approval, order, or similar authorization . . . , " provide immunity against Plaintiffs' 
claims that employees of the Washington County School District negligently 
brought a dangerous weapon onto school grounds, negligently failed to train 
students and parents regarding the weapon, and negligently failed to supervise the 
use of the weapon on school property? 
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IV. 
STATUTE AT ISSUE 
The waivers of governmental immunity and exceptions thereto codified in 
UCA section 63G-7-301 are relevant to the question before this court. The specific 
exception to immunity to be reviewed by this court is section 63G-7-301(5)(c) 
(hereinafter the "licensing exception"), which reads: 
(5) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is not 
waived under Subsections (3) and (4) if the injury arises out of, in 
connection with, or results from: 
(c) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by the 
failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, 
license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization; 
Section 63G-7-301 in its entirety is reproduced in the Addendum hereto. 
V. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case involves claims of negligence under Utah tort law and claims of 
deprivation of substantive due process in violation of 42 USC section 1983. The 
case arises out of the accidental shooting death of 15-year-old Tucker Thayer 
during a Desert Hills High School production of the play, "Oklahoma," for which 
the school utilized a Smith & Wesson .38-caliber handgun (hereafter, "the 
handgun") loaded with blank rounds. Prior to a performance, the handgun, loaded 
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with blank rounds, was discharged near Tucker's head, fatally wounding him. His 
parents seek to recover damages for Tucker's wrongful death against those public 
entities and employees who brought the handgun to the school and who failed to 
supervise its use. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
Tucker's parents, Ronald Thayer and Cathie Thayer (hereinafter, "the 
Thayers"), filed a complaint in the U. S. District Court, District of Utah, against the 
Washington County School District (hereinafter "the District"), Desert Hills High 
School (hereinafter "DHS") Vice-Principal Robert Goulding (hereinafter 
"Goulding"), DHS drama teacher Michael Eaton (hereinafter "Eaton"), DHS 
Resource Officer Stacy Richan (hereinafter "Richan"), the City of St. George 
(hereinafter "the City"), and David Amodt (hereinafter "Amodt"), owner of the 
handgun.1 
On January 25, 2010, the parties stipulated that the Thayers could not 
proceed on their state tort claims against Goulding, Eaton, and Richan, 
individually, under UCA section 63G-7-202(3)(a). See Record on Appeal (ROA), 
Docket No. 23. Accordingly, the state tort claims against those parties, 
1
 The procedural history and status of the Thayers' § 1983 claims and of those 
claims against the City, Richan, and Amodt are not given because those claims are 
unrelated to the state immunity issue certified to this court. 
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individually, were dismissed. See ROA, Docket No. 24. The Thayers' negligence 
claims against the District arising out of the actions of Goulding and Eaton remain. 
On February 24, 2010, the District filed a Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings with respect to the Thayers' negligence claims. ROA, Docket No. 27, 
Motion, attached hereto as Addendum No. 3. The District's motion argues that 
the District is immune from suit under the licensing exception of UCA section 
63G-7-301(5)(c) because the Thayers' negligence claims arise out of Goulding's 
"approval" of Eaton's use of the handgun in the Oklahoma production at DHS. 
ROA, Docket No. 28, Supporting Memorandum, attached hereto as Addendum No. 
4. The Thayers filed a memorandum opposing the District's motion on March 24, 
2010. ROA, Docket No. 29, Opposing Memorandum, attached hereto as Adden-
dum No. 5. The District filed a Reply Memorandum on April 5, 2010, ROA, 
Docket No. 32, Reply, attached as Addendum No. 6, and the Thayers filed a 
memorandum of supplemental authorities on May 11, 2010, ROA, Docket No. 35, 
Supplemental Memorandum, attached as Addendum No. 7. The District's motion 
remains pending because the U.S. District Court certified the immunity issue to 
this court. ROA, Docket No. 58, Order or Certification, attached as Addendum 
No. 8. 
/ / / 
/ / / 
Page 9 
C. Statement of Facts2 
In the fall of 2008, Tucker Thayer, age 15, was a student at DHS in St. 
George, Utah. ROA, Docket No. 2, Complaint, at ^ 12. Tucker was a student in 
the theatre program, taught by Eaton, who produced a rendition of "Oklahoma" 
utilizing students at DHS. Id. at fflf 16-18. Tucker was assigned a job in the sound 
booth as a stage technician. Id. at \ 18. Early in the process of rehearsals, Eaton 
decided to fire blanks from a live handgun from the sound booth during those 
scenes that portrayed gunshots. Id. at f^ 19. Eaton arranged to use a .38 caliber, six-
shot revolver owned by Amodt, whose daughter, also a DHS student, was the stage 
manager for the play. Id. at fflf 24, 25. 
At some point during the course of rehearsals, Eaton spoke with Richan 
about his use of the handgun with blanks in the production. ROA, Docket No. 2, 
Complaint at f 20. Goulding also knew about, and consented to, the use of the 
handgun in the play. Id. at U 30. Goulding and Richan consented to Eaton's 
utilization of the handgun in the play, subject to the conditions that the gun be 
handled by an adult and be brought to the school in a locked container. Id. at f^ 31-
32. 
Neither Goulding, nor Eaton, nor Richan explained the rules to the students 
or to the students' parents, nor did they inform the parents of the students 
All citations to the record in the Statement of Facts refer to the Thayers' 
Complaint, a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum No. 2. 
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participating in the play that a real handgun was being used in the play. ROA, 
Docket No. 2, Complaint at ffif 38-40. No training was provided to the students or 
to the parents. Id. No supervision was provided by Goulding, Eaton or Richan. 
Id. at ff 42-45, 49, 51. Goulding, Eaton and Richan never followed up on how the 
gun was being used or whether the rules were being followed. Id. 
In fact, Eaton knowingly ignored the rules. ROA, Docket at No. 2, Com-
plaint, at fflj 55-58. He never once checked to make sure that the rules were being 
followed or that a parent was even present for any rehearsal or performance. Id. 
As it turned out, Tucker ended up shooting the handgun at every rehearsal and at 
every performance. Id. at fflf 46, 50, 53. During rehearsals, Eaton became aware 
that Tucker was firing the gun, but rather than stopping Tucker's use of the gun, he 
encouraged Tucker's use of the gun, telling Tucker that he was his new "favorite 
student" for firing the gun on cue. Id. at f^ 56. 
On the evening of November 15, 2008, prior to the last scheduled 
performance of Oklahoma, Tucker was in possession of the handgun in the area of 
the sound booth. ROA, Docket No. 2, Complaint at ffi[ 62-65. No adult was 
present. Id. Somehow, the handgun, loaded with a blank cartridge, was discharged 
near Tucker's head, blowing a hole through his skull and propelling bone 
fragments into his brain. Id. at ffif 64, 68-69. Tucker died later that night. Id. at 
11 70. 
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VI. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. The licensing exception, which retains immunity for decisions related 
to licensing, permitting, and the like, is intended to protect the discretion of those 
government entities and agencies that are granted the authority to issue or deny 
applications for licenses, permits, approvals, and similar authorizations. See UCA 
section 63G-7-301(5)(c). The licensing exception has no applicability to the 
operational decisions of government employees who are not engaged in, or 
responsible for, official licensing and permitting decisions. Utah's courts have 
rejected previous attempts to apply the licensing exception to nondiscretionary, 
operational decisions. See, e.g., Healthcare Services Group, Inc. v. UtahDep't of 
Health, 40 P.3d 591 (Utah 2002). Several other jurisdictions have expressly ruled 
that the licensing exception pertains to the official actions of entities that issue 
licenses, permits, and similar authorizations to private individuals. See, e.g., 
McCormickv. Walmart Stores, Inc., 600 S.E.2d 576 (W.Va. 2004). 
In this case, neither Eaton nor Goulding were engaged in any regulatory 
activity pursuant to any law that required them to issue any license or similar 
authorization. They simply made an operational decision to use a .38-caliber 
handgun during a school play, on school property. The law does not give them any 
discretionary license to "approve" their own negligent operational decisions and 
Page 12 
actions. To rule otherwise would eviscerate significant statutory and case law of 
this state, and would lead to absurd results. 
B. One of the most fundamental rules of statutory construction refutes 
the District's proffered interpretation of the licensing exception. Basic juris-
prudence presumes that the state legislature intended to give effect to each statu-
tory provision that it passes, and it is the duty of the courts to read all provisions of 
a statute in harmony one with another, giving effect to each. See, e.g., Archuleta v. 
St. Mark's Hosp., 238 P.3d 1044, 1046 (Utah 2010). The District's construction of 
the licensing exception violates this rule of statutory construction because virtually 
every decision of every government employee could be cast as a so-called 
"approval." Thus, the District's construction of the licensing exemption would 
virtually eviscerate the statutory waiver of immunity for negligent actions codified 
in UCA section 63G-7-301(4). And without a doubt, the District's interpretation 
of the licensing exception would completely nullify and eviscerate UCA section 
63G-7-301(3), inasmuch as every design of every highway and every improvement 
project requires one or more approvals of one or more agencies in every instance. 
Clearly, our legislature intended that section 63G-7-301(3) have actual meaning 
and applicability. Therefore, the legislature did not intend that the licensing 
exception be applied in the manner argued by the District. 
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C. Eaton's and Goulding's decision to utilize the handgun in the school 
play was an operational decision of the same type that has been analyzed many 
times under the "discretionary function" exception of section 63G-7-301(5)(a). 
Section 63G-7-301(5)(a) retains immunity for the "exercise or performance, or the 
failure to exercise or perform, a discretionary function . . . " This court has 
made clear that this "discretionary function" exception applies to the exercise of 
basic policy evaluation and promulgation. E.g., Morrison v. Salt Lake City Corp. 
600 P.2d 553, 555 (Utah 1979). The "discretionary function" exception does not 
apply to ministerial and operational decisions and actions of government 
employees. Id. This case involves operational decisions and actions of the 
employees of DHS, and therefore, the District is not immune from suit. 
VII. 
ARGUMENTS 
This case still is in the pleading stage in the U.S. District Court. Because 
the District's motion is based solely on Plaintiffs' complaint, the complaint's 
allegations, and all inferences therefrom, are to be interpreted in Plaintiffs' favor. 
See Cookv. City of Moroni, 107 P.3d 713 (Utah Ct App. 2005). Applying that 
standard, Plaintiffs' complaint adequately states claims that Eaton and Goulding 
Since the filing of the District's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, several 
depositions have been taken. However, because the District's motion requests 
judgment solely on the allegations of the Complaint, no deposition transcripts have 
been filed in the U.S. District Court or included in the Record on Appeal. 
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committed acts of negligence within the course and scope of their employment at 
DHS, and that those negligent acts do not fall within any exception to the waiver of 
immunity for negligent acts under section 63G-7-301(4), which expressly waives 
immunity "as to any injury proximately cause by a negligent act or omission of an 
employee committed within the scope of employment." 
In this case, the complaint alleges that Eaton and Goulding: negligently 
allowed a dangerous handgun to be brought to and used on the school premises; 
negligently failed to train their own staff, the students, and the students' parents 
regarding the handgun; negligently failed to inspect the handgun; and negligently 
failed to supervise the handgun while it was on the school premises. See ROA, 
Docket No.2, Complaint at ^} 38-51. The complaint alleges that the negligent 
actions and inactions of Eaton and Goulding occurred in the course and scope of 
their employment, and proximately caused Tucker's death. Id. at ^[ 77-80. 
There is no dispute in this case that the complaint sets forth a cause of action 
within the negligence waiver of section 63G-7-301 (4). The sole issue certified to 
this court is whether, under any interpretation of the complaint, immunity was 
retained for the negligent conduct and decisions of Eaton and Goulding under the 
licensing exception codified in section 63G-7-301 (5)(c). As shown below, 
Goulding and Eaton's negligent actions and decisions did not constitute the type of 
regulatory function covered by the licensing exception. 
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A. Defendants1 negligence did not constitute the "issuance" of an 
"approval" under the licensing exception. 
The licensing exception contemplates more official action than just the 
ministerial actions of a government employee in their day-to-day operations. 
Although no Utah case has expressly ruled on the meaning of the terms "issuance" 
and "approval" under the licensing exception, in Healthcare Services Group, Inc. 
v. Utah Department of Health, 40 P.3d 591 (Utah 2002), this court rejected the 
Department of Health's attempt to apply the licensing exception to its operational 
decision approving a Medicaid reimbursement payment to the Federal Health Care 
Financing Administration ("HCFA"). There, Healthcare Services, a housekeeping 
services provider that held a perfected security interest in a nursing home's 
accounts receivable, was owed money by the nursing home. The HCFA imposed 
penalties against the nursing home and made request on the Department of Health 
to divert Medicaid payments that were owed to the nursing home to HCFA. Id. at 
593-94. The Department of Health approved HCFA's request, transferring 
Medicaid payments to HCFA in violation of the UCC-1 lien of Healthcare 
Services. Id. at 594. 
On appeal to this court, the Department of Health argued that its negligent 
decision was not actionable because the Department was immune under the 
licensing exception. The Department attempted to go so far as to make its decision 
to pay HCFA appear as an official act because the Department of Health had 
Page 16 
regulatory authority over the nursing home's license. Mat 599. This court found 
the Department's argument to be meritless. This court ruled: 
This claim has nothing to do with the "issuance, denial, suspension or 
revocation of... any permit, license, certificate, approval, order or 
similar authorization." Rather, the claim is based on a perfected security 
interest and seeks recovery of funds wrongfully paid to another party . . . 
Under the circumstances, we fail to see any application of this waiver 
exception to the facts of this case. 
Id 
The reasoning of Healthcare Services Group applies with equal force in this 
case. As this court determined, the Department of Health in Healthcare Services 
Group made an operational decision permitting payment to the FCHA. Id. 
Similarly, in this case Goulding made an operational decision permitting Eaton to 
use the handgun in the school play. But then beyond that, Goulding and Eaton 
failed to provide any training or supervision regarding the handgun. In this case, 
as was the case in Healthcare Services Group, Goulding and Eaton were not 
engaged in the exercise of regulatory authority governing the issuance of any 
license, permit, approval, or similar authorization. They simply made negligent 
decisions and negligently failed to act to properly train or supervise their students 
in the course of their school activities. 
Neither Goulding nor Eaton is charged with the regulatory authority to issue 
a permit for any handgun. Just as the Department of Health in Healthcare Services 
Group did not have any statutory or regulatory authority to violate Healthcare 
Page 17 
Services' perfected security interest, neither Eaton nor Goulding had any statutory 
or regulatory authority to negligently permit a minor, Tucker Thayer, to possess 
and use a handgun in violation of UCA section 76-10-509. The licensing 
exception does not protect such operational conduct. See Healthcare Services 
Group, 40 P.3d at 599. 
Under the District's interpretation of the licensing exception, this court's 
decision in Healthcare Services Group was wrong because the Department of 
Health "approved" HCFA's request for payment. But the Healthcare Services 
Group decision was not wrong. Other state courts that have analyzed similar 
licensing exceptions have ruled that the exception applies to official regulatory 
activity by those agencies charged with the duty to regulate specific activities. 
In McCormick v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 600 S.E.2d 576 (W. Va. 2004), the 
West Virginia Supreme Court, in describing the intent and scope of a similar 
licensing exception, stated: 
[The licensing exception] relates to immunity for a political subdivision 
for liability for injuries that are caused by the conduct of a private party 
who obtains a permit or license for that conduct from the political 
subdivision. The reason for establishing such immunity is readily under-
standable. In an era when much private conduct is subject to permitting 
or licensing by public bodies, absent some sort of "licensing" immunity 
that applies under ordinary circumstances, such public bodies could be 
made co-defendants in the majority of tort actions arising from the 
licensed or permitted private conduct. 
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Id. at 581. The McCormick court then held that West Virginia's licensing 
exception did not preclude a claim for negligent management and maintenance of a 
storm water drainage system. Id. 
Similarly, in Watson v. Apache County, 189 P.3d 1085 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2008), the Arizona Court of Appeals, reviewing a licensing exception nearly 
identical to Utah's exception, rejected the county's contention that its "approval" 
of a fence within a private easement immunized the county under Arizona's 
licensing exception. When the Watson plaintiff was sued over the fence, the 
plaintiff filed a third-party complaint against Apache County for negligently 
advising her where she could place the fence. Id. at 1087 - 88. Apache County 
argued that it retained immunity under the licensing exception because it had 
expressly given its approval of the plaintiffs fence. Id. The Watson court rejected 
the immunity argument, reasoning that the licensing exception, by its clear terms, 
contemplates official government action in the exercise of express governmental 
authority. Id. The court ruled that the county was not engaging in any protected 
regulatory activity because the fence was on private property, and the plaintiff was 
not required by any law to obtain any approval from the county before constructing 
a fence on a private easement. Id. The court pointed out that the legislature's use 
of the terms "issuance" and "authorization" clearly indicate that the licensing 
exception applies to the exercise of official regulatory powers, whereas in that 
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case, the advice and representations made to the plaintiff were unofficial, non-
regulatory, operational activities. Id. 
57 Am. Jur.2d Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability 
section 180 summarizes the jurisprudence concerning licensing exceptions: 
Tort claim statutes, generally waiving governmental immunity, may 
expressly except from that waiver any cause of action arising out of the 
issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of a permit, license, 
certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization. The intent of such a 
statute is to protect a policy-making discretion of public employees to 
determine whether or not a permit should issue and thus it is no defense 
when the public entity has no discretion. Immunity under such a statute 
is thus retained only with respect to discretionary activities, including 
decisions in cases where the entity is under a statutory obligation to 
make such a discretionary decision. 
(Footnotes omitted). 
Such reasoning permeates the decisions of state courts that have analyzed 
licensing exceptions. When read in context, the licensing exception is intended to 
cover the regulatory, discretionary activities of government agencies that are 
endowed with the authority to regulate a particular activity. See Paedae v. 
Escambia County, 709 So. 2d 575, 578 (Fla. Ct. App. 1998) ("there has never 
been and there is no present state tort liability imposed for peculiarly governmental 
functions such as permitting."); cf. Inland Empire Health Plan vs. Superior Court, 
133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 735, 740 (Cal. App. 2003) (holding government agency immune 
under licensing exception because its "decision to credential Dr. Durante was a 
discretionary one. . . . "). For that reason, the Utah Court of Appeals found 
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immunity for Utah County where the County was sued for negligent approval of a 
private party's subdivision plat. See DeVilliers v. Utah County, 882 P.2d 1161, 
1165 - 67 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Similarly, in Moss v. Pete Suazo Utah Athletic 
Commission, 175 P.3d 1042, 1046 (Utah 2007), this court found that the commis-
sion was immune from suit under the licensing exception because its challenged 
decision was directly related to the licensing activity it was endowed by law to 
perform - that being the licensing of boxers. 
The above authorities from both Utah and elsewhere show that "issuance" of 
"approvals" in the licensing exception refers to discretionary activities similar to 
licensing and permitting, such as a city's denials or approvals of subdivision plats 
or zoning variances. But here, the District and its employees were not performing 
any discretionary activity regarding an application for a license, permit, or 
approval. Rather, they made a negligent operational decision to create a dangerous 
condition at DHS, and then they negligently failed to supervise the dangerous 
instrumentality which they brought onto their campus. For such operational 
negligence, there is no immunity. See Healthcare Services Group, 40 P.3d at 599; 
Morrison, 600 P.2d at 555; Hazel v. Dep't ofTransp., 154 Cal. Rptr. 142, 146 (Cal. 
App. 1979) ("A public entity has no discretion to create a dangerous condition of 
its property."). Accordingly, the licensing exception does not provide immunity 
for the District in this case. 
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B. Defendants5 interpretation of the licensing exception violates a 
fundamental rule of statutory construction, and would lead to 
absurd results. 
When interpreting a statute, this court presumes that the state legislature 
intended to give effect to each statutory provision that it passes, and this court will 
read a statute's provisions in harmony one with another, giving effect to each. See 
Archuleta, 238 P.3d at 1046. Thus, in this case, the District's argument that it is 
immune under the licensing exception warrants analysis not just of the licensing 
exception, but also of the waivers of immunity to which it applies: UCA sections 
63G-7-301(3) and (4). Section 63G-7-301(4) waives immunity "as to any injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment." Section 63G-7-301(3) waives immunity for 
patently defective or dangerous conditions of any highway, street, sidewalk, 
appurtenant structures, or any public buildings, structures, or public improvements. 
With regard to those two waivers of immunity, the licensing exception, section 
63G-7-301(5)(c), retains immunity for uthe issuance, denial, suspension, or 
revocation of, or . . . the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any 
permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization." 
The District's argument that it is immune under the licensing exception 
based on its employees' decision to "approve" the use of the handgun in its school 
play is unsound and absurd because, if the licensing exception were so broad as to 
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cover such activity, the waivers of immunity in sections 63G-7-301(3) and (4) 
would be ineffective and superfluous. The licensing exception, under Defendants' 
interpretation, would wholly swallow the waivers of immunity to which it applies. 
Consider section 63-G-7-301(3). That section unambiguously waives 
immunity for any patently defective or dangerous highway or other public 
improvement. This court has enforced it in many cases. See, e.g., Braithwaite v. 
West Valley City Corp., 860 P.2d 336 (Utah 1993); Trujillo vs. Utah Dep't of 
Transp., 986 P.2d 752 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). But if, as the District argues, its 
employees' operational and supervisory negligence is immune under the licensing 
exception because they "approved" the handgun's use in their school play, such a 
scope would make the licensing exception so broad as to completely swallow and 
nullify section 63G-7-301(3). 
Every single highway, street, and public improvement goes through one or 
more levels of approval. The agency designing or constructing the improvement 
certainly, in all cases, approves its own design and construction, and government 
employees from other departments may also render approvals of the designs and 
construction phases of any project. If the government were immune from liability 
for its approvals of its own operational decisions, then section 63G-7-301(3) would 
be superfluous and meaningless. Such breadth of the licensing exception would 
mean that the legislature essentially played a sick joke on the courts and on the 
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citizens of this state, giving the appearance that it intended to permit claims arising 
from patent defects in highways and public improvements, when in reality no 
action may be maintained as a result of any defective or dangerous public 
improvement because, in all cases, public improvements are "approved" both at the 
design phase and at the construction phase. But clearly, the legislature must have 
intended that section 63G-7-301(3) means what it says. See Archuleta, 238 P.3d at 
1046. It follows, then, that the legislature did not intend that the licensing 
exemption be so broad as to cover a government agency's or employee's negligent 
operational decisions. 
The same analysis applies to section 63G-7-301(4). Nearly every decision 
of every government actor involves some level of discretion. Trujillo, 986 P.2d at 
758. Such "discretion" could be cast as an "approval" in virtually every instance. 
Thus, if the licensing exception applied every time a government agency or actor 
"approved" its own operational decisions, section 63G-7-301(4), like section 63G-
7-301(3), never would have any effect. But again, the fundamental rule of statu-
tory construction when interpreting multiple sections of statute in unison refutes 
such an interpretation. See Archuleta, 238 P.3d at 1046. 
In addition, the District's interpretation of the licensing exception would 
lead to absurd results. By way of illustration, under the District's interpretation of 
the licensing exemption, a police patrolman who recklessly causes multiple traffic 
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deaths while speeding at 120 m.p.h. would be immune from suit under the 
licensing exception where the patrolman's sergeant approved the patrolman's use 
of the patrol car that day. In fact, every government agency could immunize every 
driver of every government vehicle from liability by expressly "approving" their 
use of every vehicle, or to take it a logical step further, by sending an intra-agency 
e-mail that approves and authorizes the negligent operation of any agency vehicle. 
The District's interpretation of the licensing exception is untenable. It 
violates the most basic rule of statutory construction and would render virtually all 
tort claims against any government actor or agency obsolete inasmuch as the 
licensing exception would swallow, and nullify, sections 63G-7-301(3) and 63G-7-
301(4). Because the legislature generally allows negligence claims and premises 
liability claims against the government except in situations where the discretion of 
governmental agencies to perform their basic and necessary policy and regulatory 
functions is under attack, see Healthcare Services Group, 40 P.3d at 599, the 
District's broad interpretation of the licensing exception fails. Because, in this 
case, the negligent acts of Eaton and Goulding were not core or basic discretionary 
or regulatory functions, their negligent actions are not immune under the licensing 
exception or any other exception. See, e.g., id. 
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C. This court historically has analyzed operational decisions and 
conduct such as defendants' conduct in this case under the 
discretionary function exception in section 63G-7-301(5)(a). 
The discretionary function exception protects "the exercise or performance, 
or the failure to exercise or perform, a discretionary function, whether or not the 
discretion is abused." § 63G-7-301(5)(a). The term "discretionary" does not 
refer to the casual use of the word, because nearly "all acts performed by govern-
mental employees involve some amount of discretion." Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 
919 P.2d 568, 575 (Utah 1996). Rather, the term applies to those governmental 
decisions that involve "a basic policy making function." Id. In Doe v. Arguelles, 
716 P.2d 279, 282 - 83 (Utah 1985), this court stated: 
Operational, routine, everyday matters not requiring evaluation of broad 
policy factors and which only implement established policy are 
nondiscretionary, ministerial functions. A decision or action 
implementing a pre-existing policy is operational in nature and is 
undeserving of protection under the discretionary function exception. 
While the licensing exception covers the regulatory functions of agencies that have 
discretion to issue licenses and permits to private parties, see McCormick, 600 
S.E.2d at 581, the discretionary function exception pertains to those decisions 
"requiring evaluation of basic governmental policy matters and do not include acts 
and decisions at the operational level - those every day, routine matters not 
requiring 'evaluation of broad policy factors.'" Nelson, 919 P.2d at 575 
(quotations omitted). 
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This case involves the operational decisions of the employees of DHS, and 
their supervisory activities at DHS. This case does not involve any type of 
permitting or similar activity. This is not a case where Eaton and Goulding were 
involved in any basic policy-making function. Rather, they made operational 
decisions as to how to implement policy and how to carry out their school play. 
They negligently brought a dangerous weapon onto the school premises, they 
negligently failed to train parents and students with regard to the dangerous 
handgun that they brought to the school, and they negligently failed to supervise 
the handling and use of the handgun during the rehearsals and performances of the 
Oklahoma production. Those were operational actions and inactions that did not 
involve the exercise of basic government discretion that would blanket those 
actions and inactions with immunity. See Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517, 519 - 20 
(Utah 1980). 
Morrison is dispositive. There, following the reasoning of Carroll v. State 
Road Commission, 496 P.2d 888 (Utah 1972), this court held that the State Tax 
Commission's decision to sell a person's impounded motorcycle without notice of 
the impending sale to the owner was an operational decision not subject to 
immunity. Id. at 555. The court stated that any "decision which does not require 
the exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise is not 
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discretionary, but operational, and is not protected." Id. (quoting Carroll, 496 P.2d 
at 891). 
Such is the case here. Defendants made an operational decision to bring the 
handgun onto the school premises for use in the Oklahoma production. They then 
negligently failed to train any students or parents regarding the handgun, and they 
negligently failed to supervise its use during the Oklahoma production. Those 
negligent actions were operational and ministerial in nature, undeserving of 
immunity. See id. 
VIII. 
CONCLUSION 
The Thayers' complaint sets forth the elements of negligence claims against 
the District. Those negligence claims, based on the actions of Eaton and Goulding 
within the course of their employment with the District, are actionable under 
section 63G-7-301(4). The negligent decisions and conduct of those government 
actors are not clothed with immunity under the licensing exception or the 
discretionary function exception because Defendants' actions did not involve the 
exercise of any regulatory or discretionary function, but rather, were operational 
and ministerial in nature. Accordingly, this court should rule that Eaton's and 
Goulding's actions and inactions forming the basis for Plaintiffs' complaint are not 
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immune from suit under the licensing exception or any other exception codified in 
section 63G-7-301(5). 
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 <^LS day of February, 2011. 
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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ADDENDUM #1 
Utan uoae 
UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE Home | Site Map | Calendar | Code/Constitution | House | Senate | Search 
Title/Chapter/Section: [^ 
Utah Code 
Title 63G General Government 
Chapter 7 Governmental Immunity Act of Utah 
Section 301 Waivers of immunity — Exceptions. 
63G-7-301. Waivers of immunity — Exceptions. 
(1) (a) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is waived as to any contractual obligation. 
(b) Actions arising out of contractual rights or obligations are not subject to the requirements of 
Sections 63G-7-401, 63G-7-402, 63G-7-403, or 63G-7-601. 
(c) The Division of Water Resources is not liable for failure to deliver water from a reservoir or 
associated facility authorized by Title 73, Chapter 26, Bear River Development Act, if the failure to 
deliver the contractual amount of water is due to drought, other natural condition, or safety condition 
that causes a deficiency in the amount of available water. 
(2) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is waived: 
(a) as to any action brought to recover, obtain possession of, or quiet title to real or personal property; 
(b) as to any action brought to foreclose mortgages or other liens on real or personal property, to 
determine any adverse claim on real or personal property, or to obtain an adjudication about any 
mortgage or other lien that the governmental entity may have or claim on real or personal property; 
(c) as to any action based on the negligent destruction, damage, or loss of goods, merchandise, or 
other property while it is in the possession of any governmental entity or employee, if the property was 
seized for the purpose of forfeiture under any provision of state law; 
(d) subject to Subsection 63G-7-302(l), as to any action brought under the authority of Article I, 
Section 22, of the Utah Constitution, for the recovery of compensation from the governmental entity 
when the governmental entity has taken or damaged private property for public uses without just 
compensation; 
(e) subject to Subsection 63G-7-302(2), as to any action brought to recover attorney fees under 
Sections 63G-2-405 and 63G-2-802; 
(f) for actual damages under Title 67, Chapter 21, Utah Protection of Public Employees Act; or 
(g) as to any action brought to obtain relief from a land use regulation that imposes a substantial 
burden on the free exercise of religion under Title 63L, Chapter 5, Utah Religious Land Use Act. 
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), immunity from suit of each governmental entity is 
waived as to any injury caused by: 
(i) a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, 
sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure located on them; or 
(ii) any defective or dangerous condition of a public building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other 
public improvement. 
(b) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is not waived if the injury arises out of, in 
connection with, or results from: 
(i) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, 
sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure located on them; or 
(ii) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any public building, structure, dam, reservoir, 
or other public improvement. 
(4) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is waived as to any injury proximately caused by 
a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of 
Fage lot 5 
employment. 
(5) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is not waived under Subsections (3) and (4) if the 
injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from: 
(a) the exercise or performance, or the failure to exercise or perform, a discretionary function, 
whether or not the discretion is abused; 
(b) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse 
of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or 
violation of civil rights; 
(c) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, 
suspend, or revoke, any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization; 
(d) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or negligent inspection; 
(e) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding, even if malicious or 
without probable cause; 
(f) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent or intentional; 
(g) riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence, and civil disturbances; 
(h) the collection of and assessment of taxes; 
(i) the activities of the Utah National Guard; 
(j) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city jail, or other place of legal 
confinement; 
(k) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands; 
(1) any condition existing in connection with an abandoned mine or mining operation; 
(m) any activity authorized by the School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration or the 
Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands; 
(n) the operation or existence of a pedestrian or equestrian trail that is along a ditch, canal, stream, or 
river, regardless of ownership or operation of the ditch, canal, stream, or river, if: 
(i) the trail is designated under a general plan adopted by a municipality under Section 10-9a-401 or 
by a county under Section 17-27a-401; 
(ii) the trail right-of-way or the right-of-way where the trail is located is open to public use as 
evidenced by a written agreement between the owner or operator of the trail right-of-way, or of the 
right-of-way where the trail is located, and the municipality or county where the trail is located; and 
(iii) the written agreement: 
(A) contains a plan for operation and maintenance of the trail; and 
(B) provides that an owner or operator of the trail right-of-way or of the right-of-way where the trail 
is located has, at minimum, the same level of immunity from suit as the governmental entity in 
connection with or resulting from the use of the trail. 
(o) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding for the clearing of fog; 
(p) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural disasters; 
(q) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or storm systems; 
(r) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being driven in accordance with the requirements of 
Section 41-6a-212; 
(s) the activities of: 
(i) providing emergency medical assistance; 
(ii) fighting fire; 
(iii) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or hazardous wastes; 
(iv) emergency evacuations; 
(v) transporting or removing injured persons to a place where emergency medical assistance can be 
rendered or where the person can be transported by a licensed ambulance service; or 
(vi) intervening during dam emergencies; 
(t) the exercise or performance, or the failure to exercise or perform, any function pursuant to Title 
Utah Code 
73, Chapter 10, Board of Water Resources - Division of Water Resources; or 
(u) unauthorized access to government records, data, or electronic information systems by any person 
or entity. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 382, 2008 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 63G07_030100.ZIP 5,684 Bytes 
« Previous Section (63G-7-203) Next Section (63G-7-302) » 
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GALLIAN, WILCOX, 
WELKER, OLSON & BECKSTROM, L.C. 
Jeffrey C.Wilcox (4441) 
jwilcox@gwwo.com 
John L Collins (10790) 
jcollins@gwwo.com 
965 East 700 South, Suite 305 
St. George, Utah 84790 
Telephone: (435) 628-1682 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
RON THAYER and CATHIE THAYER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WASHINGTON COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, CITY OF ST. GEORGE, 
ROBERT GOULDING, MICHAEL EATON, 
STACY RICHAN, DAVID AMODT, JOHN 
and JANE DOES I-X, ABC 
CORPORATIONS I-X, and XYZ 
PARTNERSHIPS I-X, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT 
JURY DEMANDED 
Civil No. 2:09-cv-565 
Judge Dee Benson 
Plaintiffs Ron Thayer and Cathie Thayer (collectively "the Thayers"), by and through the 
law offices of GALLIAN, WILCOX, WELKER, OLSON & BECKSTROM, L.C, for their Complaint 
against Defendants aver as follows: 
// 
// 
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. Plaintiffs Ron and Cathie Thayer are the parents and survivors of Tucker Thayer 
("Tucker")., who is now deceased. The Thayers are residents of Washington County, Utah, as 
was Tucker prior to his death. 
2. On information and belief, Defendant Washington County School District ("District") 
is apolitical subdivision of the State of Utah, operating in Washington County, Utah, and is 
subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. 
3. On information and belief, Defendant City of St. George ("St. George") is a political 
subdivision of the State of Utah, operating in Washington County, Utah, and is subject to the 
jurisdiction of this Court. 
4. On information and belief, Defendant Robert Goulding ("Mr. Goulding") is a resident 
and domiciliary of Washington County, Utah, and is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. 
5. On information and belief, Defendant Michael Eaton ("Mr. Eaton") is a resident and 
domiciliary of Washington County, Utah, and is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court, 
6. On information and belief, Defendant Stacy Richan ("SRO Richan") is a resident and 
domiciliary of Washington County, Utah, and is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. 
7. On information and belief, Defendant David Amodt ("Mr. Amodt") is a resident and 
domiciliary of Washington County, Utah, and is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. 
8. The conduct complained of herein occurred in Washington County, Utah. 
9. This action arises under a federal statute, to wit, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2009). As such, 
jurisdiction in this Court is proper and is predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
10. Venue in this Court is proper and is predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1)—(2). 
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11. The Thayers are entitled to have this matter tried to a jury, and they hereby demand 
the same. 
GENERAL FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
12. Ron and Cathie Thayer are the parents of Tucker Thayer, a fifteen-year-old child who 
was shot and killed with a handgun loaded with blanks on November 15, 2008, at his school, 
Desert Hills High School ("Desert Hills"). 
13. However, unlike other tragic shootings that have occurred at other schools in the past, 
the handgun that killed Tucker Thayer was at the school with the approval and support of the 
school's employees and administration as well as the local police department. 
14. Desert Hills is a secondary school owned and operated by Defendant District in St. 
George, Utah. 
15. The District opened Desert Hills for the 2008 school year, giving Tucker the 
opportunity to attend high school in his own neighborhood, near his home. 
16. Tucker was an energetic and creative boy, and in order to develop his talents and 
abilities, Tucker became involved with the theater program at Desert Hills. 
17. Mr. Eaton was Tucker's theater teacher and an employee of the District. 
18. When the school and theater program took on the ambitious project to produce the 
Rogers and Hammerstein classic musical "Oklahoma" during the fall of 2008, Tucker was 
excited to participate as a stage tech under the direction of Mr. Eaton. 
19. Possibly to give the production a sense of realism and drama, Mr. Eaton decided to 
use a real handgun in the play, but not as an on-stage prop. Mr. Eaton wanted to actually fire a 
handgun, loaded with a blank round, in the theater as a sound effect. 
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20. However, state law and Defendant District's policies prohibit the possession of 
dangerous weapons on the campus of any public school. Therefore, before following through 
with his plan, Mr. Eaton consulted with the in-house representative of the St. George Police 
Department, School Resource Officer Stacy Richan. 
21. The St. George Police Department ("SGPD") is a political subdivision wholly 
controlled and operated by Defendant St. George. 
22. Apparently believing that the handgun Mr. Eaton was proposing to use for the play 
was capable of only firing blanks, SRO Richan approved the use of the handgun on school 
property as long as an adult brought the weapon to school for rehearsals and performances; the 
weapon remained under the adult's control and in a locked container until it was to be used; and 
the weapon was only to be fired by the adult. 
23. SRO Richan never asked to inspect the weapon prior to giving his approval 
24. The gun Mr. Eaton decided to use for the performance belongs to Mr. Amodt, whose 
daughter was the student stage manager of "Oklahoma." 
25. The weapon was a Smith & Wesson .38 caliber, six-shot revolver capable of being 
fired either by a single action trigger pull or by a double action trigger pull, and was fully 
capable of firing live .38 caliber ammunition rounds; not just blanks as was supposed by SRO 
Richan. 
26. In addition, the weapon had been altered from its factory specifications to give it a 
"hair trigger," reducing by half the amount offeree required to pull the trigger, whether a single 
or double action trigger pull. 
// 
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27. The modifications of the gun caused it to sometimes jam when the double action 
trigger pull was used to fire the gun. 
28. The only way to reliably fire the gun without it jamming was to cock the hammer and 
engage the single trigger pull. 
29. With the trigger thus cocked, the only thing preventing the gun from firing was the 
modified single action hair trigger. 
30. Mr. Goulding also knew about and consented to the use of Mr. Amodt's dangerous 
weapon on school grounds. 
31. After Mr. Eaton spoke to SRO Richan regarding using Mr. Amodt's gun during the 
play, SRO Richan approached Mr. Goulding and told him about his (SRO Richan's) 
conversation with Mr. Eaton. SRO Richan told Mr. Goulding that he (SRO Richan) had 
authorized the gun to be used during the play and told Mr. Goulding the rules he had imposed for 
the use of the gun. 
32. Mr. Goulding agreed with SRO Richan and authorized the use of the gun during the 
play, so long as SRO Richan saw that the rules were followed. 
33. SRO Richan also told Mr. Goulding that he had spoken to superiors at SGPD 
regarding the use of the gun during the play. 
34. Mr. Amodt's wife also spoke with Mr. Goulding on or about November 5, 2008, in 
order to make sure that the school would not be placed in "lockdown" based on the presence of 
the gun on school property. 
// 
// 
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35. In response to Mrs. Amodt's questions, Mr. Goulding, on behalf of the District, 
authorized the use of the weapon for the production of "Oklahoma" under the conditions 
imposed by SRO Richan. 
36. Like SRO Richan, Mr. Goulding did not inspect the weapon prior to approving its use 
on school property. 
37. Neither SRO Richan, nor Mr. Goulding, nor Mr. Eaton ever required the cast of 
"Oklahoma" to participate in safety training with regards to the handgun. 
38. Upon information and belief, no one from the District or SGPD discussed with the 
"Oklahoma" cast members the dangers of using the firearm; nobody from the District or SGPD 
taught the students the dangers associated with the blanks that would fired from the gun; nobody 
from the District or SGPD told the cast members that it was illegal for children under eighteen 
years old to possess or use handguns; nobody from the District or SGPD explained to the 
students the rules regarding how the handgun would be brought to and from school; nobody from 
the District or SGPD explained to the students where the gun was to be stored; and nobody from 
the District or SGPD informed the students that only Mr. Amodt was to use and shoot the gun. 
39. Furthermore, SRO Richan, Mr. Goulding, and Mr. Eaton never informed the parents 
of the students involved in the play that a "dangerous weapon," as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 
76-10-501(5) (2009), was going to be used in the play. 
40. No one from the District and/or SGPD obtained written permission from the students' 
parents authorizing their children to be involved in the play when a dangerous weapon would be 
part of the production. 
// 
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41. The Thayers never gave permission to the school to allow Tucker to possess, handle 
and/or shoot the weapon during the rehearsals and/or the performances of the play. 
42. SRO Richan, Mr. Goulding, Mr. Eaton and Mr. Amodt each failed to implement and 
enforce the rules SRO Richan set forth governing the use of the dangerous weapon. 
43. Instead of having an adult bring the gun to school, Mr. Amodt often entrusted his 
minor daughter with the responsibility of carrying the weapon to school in her backpack. 
44. Instead of having constant adult supervision over the weapon, it was left, in its lock 
box, unattended in the sound booth. Indeed, Mr. Eaton later acknowledged that the gun was 
simply "brought in and kept in [Mr. Amodt's daughter's] backpack under the soundboard." 
45. Instead of having constant adult supervision and control over the "blanks" that were 
to be fired in the gun, blank rounds were also left in the sound booth, unattended, before each 
rehearsal and/or performance. 
46. Instead of having an adult shoot the gun, Tucker was allowed to shoot the gun during 
the last two weeks of rehearsals leading to the opening of the play and during each of the 
performances of the play. 
47. Mr. Amodt allowed Tucker to shoot the gun during rehearsals and performances 
because Tucker knew the play and knew when to shoot the gun. 
48. Even though Mr. Amodt had, on occasion, warned Tucker to stop messing around 
with the gun until the proper scene, he continued to allow Tucker to shoot the gun during 
rehearsals and performances of the play. 
49. During most of the time that Tucker fired the handgun during rehearsals and/or 
performances, he did so without adult supervision and, indeed, with no adult present. 
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50. Tucker was under the impression that shooting the gun was his "job." In an interview 
Tucker gave the day before his death, he said that his "job basically is to run the spotlight and 
shoot the gun during all of the major shooting scenes." 
51. Tucker had control of the weapon, and even played with the gun and its "blanks," 
without any adult supervision during both rehearsals and performances. 
52. Students saw Tucker point the gun at other students and even at himself, pretending 
to shoot in a joking and kidding manner. 
53. Indeed, Tucker had complete control and access of the weapon at almost all times 
during rehearsals and performances. He knew the combination of the lock box in which the gun 
was brought to school 
54. He was once observed by students removing the gun from the lock box, handing it to 
another student to see and hold, then taking the gun back and returning it to the lock box. 
55. Mr. Eaton and Mr. Amodt each knew that Tucker had access to and control of the gun 
and had been firing the weapon during rehearsals and performances, but they took no action to 
stop him from hurting himself or anyone else. 
56. Indeed, Mr. Eaton encouraged Tucker's use of the weapon. In at least one instance 
when the gun was fired on cue, Mr. Eaton told the stage manager, by two-way radio, "That was 
great! [Mr. Amodt] is my new best friend!" The stage manager replied by radio, "That was 
Tucker." Mr. Eaton responded, "Tell him he is my new favorite student." 
57. Even prior to the play, it was apparent that the weapon had not been used in a 
responsible manner. Specifically, on at least one occasion during rehearsals the cue to fire the 
gun was missed. Later, the blank was fired unexpectedly in a different scene, which caused the 
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actor playing the role of "Judd" to flinch while he was supposed to be dead, evoking laughter 
from cast members. 
58. No adult ever followed up to see why the cue had been missed, who missed the cue, 
and why the gun was fired later, at an inappropriate time. 
59. Instead, the gun and ammunition continued to be left at the school during rehearsals 
and performances in Tucker's control and without adult supervision. 
60. A few days prior to November 15,2008, the gun with three blanks was brought to the 
school, but the stage manager reported that the three blanks were missing. Mr. Amodt then 
brought three additional blanks to the play so the gun could be fired. 
61. No adult followed up to investigate what happened to the missing blanks. 
62. On November 15, 2008. The gun and three blanks were left in the sound booth 
without any adult supervision. 
63. After overhearing a conversation between Tucker and another student in the sound 
booth, an adult became concerned that Tucker might be planning a practical joke with the gun, 
such as firing the weapon at an inappropriate point in the play. However, nothing was said to 
Tucker, and the gun was left in the sound booth without adult supervision. 
64. Soon thereafter, the gun was discharged near Tucker's head. 
65. No adult was present in the sound booth when the gun discharged. 
66. At the time Tucker was shot, Mr. Amodt was in the "green room" (Mr. Eaton's 
office) showing student actors images of prior performances. 
67. Mr. Eaton was also not in the sound booth at the time Tucker was shot. Instead, he 
was near or on the stage preparing for that night's performance. 
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68. Despite not having a bullet, the muzzle blast from the live blank drove skull 
fragments into Tucker's brain. 
69. In addition, a "blowback" wound of approximately three inches in diameter was 
formed as the result of gases produced by the explosion of the gun powder exiting from the same 
hole they entered after being driven into Tucker's brain. 
70. Tucker died later that night. 
71. In circumstances other than Tucker's tragic death, the District has strict guidelines 
and prohibitions related to the presence of dangerous weapons, including handguns, on school 
property. 
72. The District's "Safe Schools Policy" imposes mandatory suspension or expulsion for 
any student who has "possession, control, or actual or threatened use of a real weapon, explosive, 
or noxious or flammable material" or who makes any "actual or threatened use of a look alike 
weapon" on school property or at school activities. 
73. The District and the SGPD have, at times, taken the threat of weapons at Desert Hills 
very seriously. For instance, on October 10, 2008—only one month before his death—Tucker, 
with the approval of Mr. Eaton, took a broken prop rifle home so that he and his father could 
repair the prop. When he returned the repaired prop rifle to the school, someone apparently saw 
him carrying the prop rifle onto school grounds, became worried, and contacted police. 
74. Desert Hills, and three other nearby schools, were "locked down" based on the 
apparent threat of a weapon on school grounds, and a police SWAT team took Tucker from his 
classroom at gunpoint, when he had to explain what he had been doing with the prop rifle. 
// 
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75. Upon information and belief, Mr. Eaton later stated that the lockdown incident was 
good publicity for the upcoming production of "Oklahoma." 
76. However, the rules and procedures that had been established and implemented to 
protect Desert Hills' students from the real, malfunctioning gun used in the play were not 
enforced when the District and the SGPD allowed the use of this deadly weapon to be used on 
school grounds for no better reason than its use as a sound effect. 
77. As the direct and proximate result of Defendants' conduct, the Thayers have incurred 
costs and expenses related to the efforts of physicians, nurses, and other health care providers to 
save Tucker's life, costs and expenses related to Tucker's burial, and other general damages, for 
which they are entitled to recover. 
78. As the direct and proximate result of Defendants' conduct, the Thayers have incurred 
damages, including, without limitation, damages for pain, suffering, loss of Tucker's time and 
earnings, loss of Tucker's support, loss of Tucker's assistance and service to the family, and loss 
of Tucker's society, companionship, and happiness of associations, each of which the Thayers 
claim as an element of special damages, for which they are entitled to recover. 
79. On information and belief, Mr. Eaton and Mr. Goulding are each agents or employees 
of Defendant District. 
80. On information and belief, all conduct of Mr. Eaton and Mr. Goulding complained of 
herein was performed in the scope of their respective employment for Defendant District. 
81. On information and belief, SRO Richan is an officer, agent, or employee of 
Defendant District and/or SGPD, which is a department of Defendant St. George. 
// 
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82. On information and belief, all conduct of SRO Richan complained of herein was 
performed in the scope of his employment for Defendant District and/or SGPD, which is a 
department of Defendant St. George. 
83. Defendants' conduct manifests and knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a 
disregard of, the rights of others, including Tucker and his parents. 
84. Pursuant to the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-7-101 
to -904 (2009), and in compliance with its requirements, the Thayers mailed to Defendant 
District and to Defendant St. George a separate Notice of Claim for Injury on March 24,2009. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
Depravation of Rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983)—Against Defendants District, SGPD, 
Messrs. Goulding and Eaton, and SRO Richan 
85. The Thayers reassert all other allegations contained in this Complaint and incorporate 
them herein as if set forth in full. 
86. Defendants District, St. George, through SGPD, Mr. Goulding, Mr. Eaton, and SRO 
Richan each had a special relationship to Tucker by virtue of their custody over Tucker while he 
was in attendance at school activities, including rehearsals and performances of the play. 
87. Moreover, and without limitation, by storing a dangerous weapon in a place where 
minors had easy access to the weapon, by failing to train the minors involved with the play about 
safe practices for being around the handgun and the policies and procedures instituted by the 
District and by St. George, through SGPD, for use of the weapon for the play, by entrusting 
Tucker with the possession and use of the dangerous weapon during the play, by failing to 
supervise Tucker while he was in control of the dangerous weapon, and by failing to implement 
or enforce the statutes, policies, and procedures that had been adopted regarding the use of such 
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dangerous weapons by minors, and specifically with respect to the use of the hand gun in the 
play, Defendants District, St. George, through SGPD, Mr. Goulding, Mr. Eaton, and SRO Richan 
created the danger that ultimately killed Tucker. 
88. Because these defendants created the danger to Tucker's safety and physical integrity, 
each of these defendants owed a duty to Tucker and to the Thayers to keep Tucker safe from 
physical harm. 
89. The District, St. George, through SGPD, Mr. Goulding, Mr. Eaton, and SRO Richan 
engaged in reckless conduct in such a manner that they each acted with the intent to place 
Tucker, and other Desert Hills students, faculty, staff, and theater-goers unreasonably at risk. 
90. The District, St. George, through SGPD, Mr. Goulding, Mr. Eaton, and SRO Richan 
were aware of a known or obvious risk that was so great that it was highly probably that serious 
harm would follow, and each defendant proceeded in conscious and unreasonable disregard of 
the consequences to an extent that their conduct shocks the conscience. 
91. Tucker was a member of a limited and specifically definable group, to wit, the Desert 
Hills student body. 
92. The conduct of the District, St. George, through SGPD, Mr. Goulding, Mr. Eaton, and 
SRO Richan put Tucker and the other members of that group at substantial risk of serious, 
immediate and proximate harm. 
93. The risk of harm was known by or was obvious to the District, St. George, through 
SGPD, Mr. Goulding, Mr. Eaton, and SRO Richan. 
94. The District, St. George, through SGPD, Mr. Goulding, Mr. Eaton, and SRO Richan 
acted recklessly in conscious disregard of those risks. 
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95. The conduct of the District, St. George, through SGPD, Mr. Goulding, Mr. Eaton, and 
SRO Richan, when viewed in totality, is conscience shocking. 
96. The District, St. George, through SGPD, Mr. Goulding, Mr. Eaton, and SRO Richan 
engaged in their conduct under color of statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs, or usages, of 
the State of Utah and its municipalities and subdivisions. 
97. Under the color of law, the District, St. George, through SGPD, Mr. Goulding, Mr. 
Eaton, and SRO Richan deprived Tucker and the Thayers of their rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws. 
98. As the direct and proximate result of the above-named Defendants' conduct, Tucker 
was killed, and the Thayers have suffered damages for which they are entitled to recover. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
Wrongful Death—Against All Defendants 
99. The Thayers reassert all other allegations of this Complaint and incorporate them 
herein as if set forth in Ml. 
100. Each of the defendants knew or should have known of the likely danger to Tucker, 
and to other students of Desert Hills or patrons attending a performance of the play, associated 
with giving a fifteen year-old student unsupervised access and control of a deadly, 
malfunctioning handgun. 
101. The degree of harm that each of the defendants foresaw, or should have foreseen, 
was extraordinarily great—death, or serious bodily injury. 
102. Each of the defendants could have easily fulfilled his duty to Tucker by preventing 
him from having access to the weapon and by following and enforcing the guidelines suggested 
by SRO Richan, and any burden associated with fulfilling the defendants' respective duties were 
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minimal, especially in contrast to the harm that could have resulted—and did, in fact, result— 
from their failures to fulfill their duties. 
103. As a consequence of these circumstances, each of the defendants had a custodial 
duty to protect Tucker from harm. 
104. Each of the defendants breached this duty to Tucker by, among other things, 
allowing Tucker unsupervised access to a dangerous weapon and failing to give Tucker any 
instruction or training with respect to the weapon. 
105. As the direct and proximate result of Defendants' conduct, Tucker was killed, and 
the Thayers have suffered damages for which they are entitled to recover. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
Negligence—Against All Defendants 
106. The Thayers reassert all other allegations of this Complaint and incorporate them 
herein as if set forth in full. 
107. Defendants each owed a duty to the Thayers, and to Tucker, to protect Tucker from 
physical harm and to keep him from possessing dangerous weapons contrary to state law, among 
other duties. 
108. Specifically, but without limitation, Defendants had duties in loco parentis over 
Tucker, to protect him even as his parents would have done had he been under their control and 
supervision and as a result of their creation of the danger to Tucker by providing him with a 
dangerous handgun in violation of state law and school policy. 
109. By giving Tucker access to a dangerous handgun, without supervision, without 
training, and in violation of state law and school policy, and by failing to protect Tucker from the 
danger that they created, Defendants each violated their duties. 
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110. By creating rules, guidelines, and conditions for allowing the presence and use of a 
dangerous handgun on school premises, but failing to enforce such rules, conditions, or 
guidelines, follow-up to determine whether or not the rules, guidelines, and conditions were 
being implemented, or investigate the actual circumstances surrounding the presence and use of 
the handgun as practiced, Defendants breached their duties to Tucker and to the Thayers. 
111. As the direct and proximate result of Defendants' conduct, Tucker was shot and 
killed, and the Thayers have suffered damages for which they are entitled to recover. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Gross Negligence—Against Alt Defendants 
112. The Thayers reassert all other allegations of this Complaint and incorporate them 
herein as if set forth in full. 
113. Defendants failed to observe even slight care with respect to the duties that they 
owed to Tucker and to the Thayers to keep Tucker safe from harm, to follow state law and 
school policies, and to prevent Tucker from having access to, and use of, a dangerous handgim. 
114. The conduct of each of the defendants shows carelessness or recklessness to a 
degree that shows utter indifference to the consequences that may result. 
115. Indeed, as the direct and proximate result of Defendants' careless and reckless 
conduct, Tucker was killed, and the Thayers have suffered damages for which they are entitled to 
recover. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Negligent Supervision—Against Defendants District, St. George, 
Mr. Goulding, andSRORichan 
116. The Thayers reassert all other allegations of this Complaint and incorporate them 
herein as if set forth in full. 
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117. Defendants District has a duty to supervise its employees and agents, including, 
without limitation, Mr. Goulding and Mr. Eaton, to ensure that state laws and school policies and 
rules were enforced and properly implemented, to ensure that its employees were not themselves 
violating state laws and school policies by giving unsupervised control of a dangerous handgun 
to students, and to ensure that Tucker was not injured by the danger to him that Defendants 
created. Mr. Goulding, by virtue of his supervisory capacity on behalf of Defendant District, 
shares these duties with Defendant District. 
118. In addition, Defendant District owed the Thayers a duty to supervise their son, 
Tucker, while he was on school premises for a school-sponsored activity, to protect Tucker from 
danger and harm in the manner that the Thayers would have had they been in a position to 
protect Tucker, as was the District and its employees. 
119. Defendant St. George has a duty to supervise its employees and agents, including, 
without limitation, SRO Richan and any other employees, officers, or agents of SGPD, to ensure 
that state laws and department rules related to the presence of dangerous firearms on school 
campuses were enforced and properly implemented. SRO Richan, as the school resource officer 
assigned to Desert Hills and as the officer who created and promulgated rules related to the 
presence of the dangerous firearm at Desert Hills, shared these duties with Defendant District. 
120. Without limitation, Defendants District and St. George, through SGPD, violated 
their duties to supervise their employees and agents when they ignored state laws prohibiting 
minors from using handguns and barring handguns from school premises, when they ignored 
district policies related to the presence of weapons on school grounds, when they ignored 
specialized rules and procedures created specifically for the use of the weapon in the production 
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of "Oklahoma" at Desert Hills, and when they allowed Tucker to have unsupervised access and 
use of the dangerous weapon. 
121. As the direct and proximate result of the above-named Defendants' careless and 
reckless conduct, Tucker was shot and killed, and the Thayers have suffered damages for which 
they are entitled to recover. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Negligent Failure to Train—Against Defendants District and St George 
122. The Thayers reassert all other allegations of this Complaint and incorporate them 
herein as if set forth in full. 
123. Defendants District and St. George, through SGPD, each had a duty to train their 
agents and employees, including Mr. Goulding, Mr. Eaton, and SRO Richan, with respect to 
state law and school policy regarding the presence of dangerous handguns on school property 
and in the possession of minors. 
124. Moreover, when Defendants District and St. George, through SGPD, chose to 
introduce the dangerous gun onto school premises, where the gun would be in close proximity 
with students, Defendants District and St. George, through SGPD, had a duty to instruct those 
students, including Tucker, on the same laws and policies. 
125. Moreover, Defendants District and St. George, through SGPD, should have 
provided adequate training with respect to the danger and appropriate use of handguns in 
general, and specifically, the malfunctioning hair trigger weapon that was actually used when 
they allowed Tucker unsupervised access to the gun, or when they at least failed to prevent 
Tucker from having access to the handgun without adult supervision. 
// 
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126. However, neither Defendant District nor Defendant St. George provided adequate 
training to their agents and employees, and no training at all was offered to the students who had 
access to the dangerous weapon. 
127. As the direct and proximate result of the above-named Defendants' conduct, the 
Thayers have suffered damages for which they are entitled to recover. 
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Violation of Statute—Against Defendants District 
and Messrs. Goulding, Eaton, andAmodt 
128. The Thayers reassert all other allegations of this Complaint and incorporate them 
herein as if set forth in full. 
129. Utah law prohibits individuals from providing handguns to minors. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-509.5(1) (2009). 
130. Tucker, as a minor child, was in the class of individuals that the legislature intended 
to protect when it passed the statute. 
131. The above-named Defendants allowed Tucker to have unsupervised access to a 
dangerous handgun, provided the handgun for Tucker's use, and encouraged his use of the 
handgun. 
132. Defendants' violation of the state statute constitutes prima facie evidence of 
negligence. 
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Negligent Entrustment—Against Defendants District 
and Messrs. Goulding, Eaton, andAmodt 
133. The Thayers reassert all other allegations of this Complaint and incorporate them 
herein as if set forth in full. 
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134. The above-named Defendants each owed the Thayers and Tucker a duty not to give 
or lend a dangerous handgun in violation of an applicable statute, ordinance, or school policy. 
135. The above-named Defendants each owed the Thayers and Tucker a duty not to 
entrust the firearm to a fifteen-year-old child. 
136. The above-named Defendants each owed the Thayers and Tucker a duty to be 
aware of the handgun and those who may gain access to the handgun after entrusting it to 
another. 
137. The above-named Defendants each owed the Thayers and Tucker a duty to train 
and/or supervise the individual to whom the handgun was entrusted. 
138. The above-named Defendants each owed the Thayers and Tucker a duty to advise 
the individual to whom they entrusted the handgun of any unusual characteristics of the weapon. 
139. The above-named Defendants each owed the Thayers and Tucker a duty to retake 
possession of the handgun upon observing signs of misuse. 
140. Each defendant breached each of these duties by, without limitation: entrusting the 
handgun to Tucker in violation of state law and school policy; entrusting the handgun to Tucker 
despite the fact that he was a minor with absolutely no experience or knowledge related to 
handguns or to blank rounds; failing to supervise Tucker while he was in possession of the 
handgun; failing to provide Tucker with any training to protect himself from the dangerous 
handgun and the blank rounds; failing to advise Tucker that the handgun had been modified in 
such a way that it had a dangerous "hair trigger"; and failing to ensure that the handgun was used 
properly after seeing evidence of its misuse. 
// 
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141. Tucker was incompetent to use a handgun and was young and inexperienced with 
handguns and with blank rounds. 
142. The above-named Defendants each knew or had reason to know, because of 
Tucker's youth, inexperience, or otherwise, that Tucker may use the weapon in a manner 
involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others who each defendant should 
have expected to share in or be endangered by the use of the handgun. 
143. Despite this knowledge, the above-named Defendants entrusted the dangerous 
weapon to Tucker. 
144. By entrusting the handgun with Tucker, the above-named Defendants created an 
appreciable risk of harm to Tucker and others. 
145. As the direct and proximate result of the above-named Defendants' conduct, Tucker 
was killed, and the Thayers have suffered damages for which they are entitled to recover. 
NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Negligent Storage of Handgun—Against Defendants District 
and Messrs. Goulding} Eaton, andAmodt 
146. The Thayers reassert all other allegations of this Complaint and incorporate them 
herein as if set forth in full. 
147. The above-named Defendants each owed a duty to the Thayers and to Tucker to 
store the handgun and the ammunition in an appropriate manner to prevent their misuse. 
148. The above-named Defendants each knew, or should have known, that Tucker was 
likely to use the handgun and the ammunition, contrary to state law prohibiting the use of 
handguns by minors, or to conduct himself in a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of harm 
to himself or to others. 
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149. The above-named Defendants' storage of the handgun under the soundboard 
without any adult supervision left the dangerous weapon in the possession and under the control 
of the individuals likely to use the weapon inappropriately and contrary to state law. 
150. The above-named Defendants each could reasonably foresee Tucker's use of the 
handgun given his youth, his inexperience with handguns and blank ammunition, and the 
specific instances where Tucker had used the handgun during the rehearsals and performances of 
the production of "Oklahoma" with Defendants' knowledge and consent, contrary to state law 
prohibiting use of handguns by minors. 
151. By storing the handgun in an inappropriate location, where Tucker could easily gain 
control and possession of the handgun and the ammunition, the above-named Defendants 
breached their duties to Tucker and to the Thayers. 
152. As the direct and proximate result of the above-named Defendants' conduct, Tucker 
was shot and killed, and the Thayers have suffered damages for which they are entitled to 
recover. 
TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Respondeat Superior—Against Defendants District and St George 
153. The Thayers reassert all other allegations of this Complaint and incorporate them 
herein as if set forth in full. 
154. The employees and agents of Defendants District and St. George, through SGPD, 
including, without limitation, Mr. Goulding, Mr. Eaton, and SRO Richan, were engaged in 
conduct of a general kind and nature that each was employed to perform. 
// 
// 
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155. The conduct of the employees and agents of Defendants District and St. George, 
through SGPD, as complained of herein, was generally directed toward the accomplishment of 
their duties and in the scope of their authority for their employers. 
156. The conduct of the employees and agents of Defendants District and St. George, 
through SGPD, as complained of herein, occurred within the hours of their work and within the 
ordinary spatial boundaries of their employment. 
157. The conduct of the employees and agents of Defendants District and St. George, 
through SGPD, was motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of serving the interests of 
Defendants District and St. George. 
158. Therefore, Defendants District and St. George should each be liable for the conduct 
of their employees and agents, as complained of herein, under the doctrine of respondeat 
superior. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Ron and Cathie Thayer respectfully request that this Court 
enter judgment against each defendant as follows: 
A. For general compensatory damages in a reasonable amount to be determined by the 
trier of fact. 
B. For special, consequential, and incidental damages in a reasonable amount to be 
determined by the trier of fact. 
C. For punitive and exemplary damages in a reasonable amount to be determined by the 
trier of fact based upon each defendant's willful and malicious or intentionally 
// 
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fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference 
toward and a disregard of, the rights of others, as may be allowed by law. 
D. For prejudgment interest on the damages assessed by the verdict as may be allowed 
by law. 
E. For Plaintiffs5 costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred herein as may be allowed 
by law, including 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2009). 
F. For any further relief that this Court may deem just and equitable under the 
circumstances. 
DATED this day of June, 2009. 
GALLIAN, WILCOX, 
WELKER, OLSON & BECKSTROM, L.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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BARRY LAWRENCE (5304) 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendants Washington County School District 
and Robert Goulding 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Telephone: (801) 366-0100 
E- mail: blawrence@utah.gov 
IN THE UNITED STATE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
RON THAYER and CATHIE THAYER 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WASHINGTON COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, CITY OF ST. GEORGE, 
ROBERT GOULDING, MICHAEL 
EATON, STACY RICHAN, DAVID 
AMODT, JOHN and JANE DOES I-X, 
ABC CORPORATIONS I-X, and XYZ 
PARTNERSHIPS I- X, 
Defendants. 
THE DISTRICT'S MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AS 
TO ALL STATE LAW CLAIMS 
Case No. 2:09 cv565 
Judge Dee Benson 
Defendant Washington County School District (the "District"), through its counsel Barry 
G. Lawrence, Assistant Utah Attorney General, moves this Court, pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for an Order dismissing all state claims against it, based on the 
Governmental Immunity Act of Utah (Utah Code Ann., § 63G-7-101, etseq., the "Immunity 
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Act.") 
The District is immune from all negligence claims pursuant to Section 63G-7-301(5)(c) 
of the Immunity Act because all of plaintiffs' injuries arise out of the issuance of an "approval, 
order or similar authorization" - namely the authorization and approval by the District to allow a 
gun to be used as a sound effect for a school play. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(c). But 
for that approval, Tucker Thayer would not have had access to the gun, would not have shot 
himself, and plaintiffs would not have suffered any injury. Accordingly, the District is immune 
from all claims of negligence herein. 
Also, the Seventh Claim, based on the violation of a criminal statute, fails as a matter of 
law because that statute does not create a private right of action. 
The District thus requests the entry of an Order dismissing all state law claims against it 
and permitting only the first claim (based on 42 U.S.C. Section 1983) to proceed against it. The 
reasons for this motion are more fully set forth in the supporting memorandum filed 
concurrently. 
Dated this 24th day of February, 2010. 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
/s/ Barry G. Lawrence 
BARRY G. LAWRENCE 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant Washington County 
School District 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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I hereby certify that on this 24th day of February, 2010,1 electronically filed the 
foregoing THE DISTRICT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AS TO 
ALL STATE LAW CLAIMS, using the court's CM/ECF system, and that the same was 
electronically sent by the court's CM/ECF system to the following: 
Jeffrey C. Wilcox, Esq. 
John Collins, Esq. 
Gallian, Wilcox, Welker, Olson & Beckstrom, L.C. 
965 East 700 South Ste 305 
St. George, Utah 84790 
jwilcox@gwwo.com 
Peter Stirba 
Bret W. Rawson 
Stirba & Associates 
215 South State St., Suite 750 
P.O. Box 810 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-0810 
peter(S>,stirba. com 
David Wolf 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
dnwolf(Sjutah. gov 
/s/ Danell Tanner 
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BARRY LAWRENCE (5304) 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendants Washington County School District 
and Robert Goulding 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Telephone: (801) 366-0100 
E- mail: blawrence@utah.gov 
IN THE UNITED STATE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
RON THAYER and CATHIE THAYER 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
WASHINGTON COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, CITY OF ST. GEORGE, 
ROBERT GOULDING, MICHAEL 
EATON, STACY RICHAN, DAVID 
AMODT, JOHN and JANE DOES I-X, 
ABC CORPORATIONS I-X, and XYZ 
PARTNERSHIPS I- X, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
THE DISTRICT'S MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AS 
TO ALL STATE LAW CLAIMS 
Case No. 2:09 cv565 
Judge Dee Benson 
Defendant Washington County School District (the "District"), through its counsel Barry 
G. Lawrence, Assistant Utah Attorney General, files this memorandum in support of its motion 
for judgment on the pleadings seeking the dismissal of all state law claims against it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In November, 2008, the Desert Hills High School drama department performed the play 
"Oklahoma." Complaint If 18. To enhance the sound effects, the production wanted to use a gun 
that shot blanks instead of a prop gun. Complaint ^ 19. But, because school policy prevents 
students from having weapons on school property, the school allowed one of the student's 
fathers, defendant David Amodt, to use the gun in the play, provided that he comply with three 
conditions: i) that only he could bring the weapon to and from school; ii) that the weapon remain 
in a locked container and under his control at all times; and iii) that only he was authorized to 
fire the weapon. Complaint |^ 22. Both the School Resource Officer (St. George City employee 
Stacy Richan) and Vice Principal Robert Goulding, authorized Mr. Amodt to use the gun, 
subject to those three conditions. Complaint ^ 22, 32. 
Apparently, however, Mr. Amodt did not follow the conditions that had been imposed on 
him. E.g., Complaint ffl[ 43-47. He permitted Tucker Thayer, a student who worked on sound 
effects for the production, to use the gun. Id. Prior to one of the performances, Tucker shot 
himself in the temple with a blank, which caused his death. Complaint ^ 64-70. Tucker's 
parents assert claims against the District and others. The gravamen of plaintiffs' claims against 
the District is that it improperly approved the use of the gun on school property and failed to 
properly supervise its use. Based on the Complaint's allegations, but for Vice Principal 
Goulding's approval to allow the use of the gun, Tucker Thayer would not have had access to the 
gun and would not have died. 
2 
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Based on those facts, the District is entitled to immunity from all negligence claims. The 
Governmental Immunity Act of Utah (the "Immunity Act") unequivocally immunizes the 
District from any claim for injuries that "arises out o f the "issuance . . . [of] any permit, license, 
certificate, approval, order ox similar authorization." See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-
301(5)(c)(emphasis added.) Here, Vice Principal Goulding's approval of the gun's use is 
precisely the type of conduct intended to be covered by this section of the Immunity Act. 
Moreover, Utah case law construes the phrase "arises out of broadly to require only a "but for" 
nexus between the approval and plaintiffs' injuries. Based on the Complaint, but for the 
approval of the gun's use, Tucker Thayer would not have died and plaintiffs would not have 
suffered any damage. Accordingly, the District is immune from all state law damage claims. 
FACTS FROM PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT1 
The Parties and the Claims 
1. The District is a governmental entity. Complaint ^ 2, 84. 
2. Plaintiffs assert nine claims against the District. In addition to a section 1983 
claim (the First Claim (Complaint fflf 85-98)), they assert eight negligence claims as follows: 
2nd Claim Wrongful Death (Complaint TR 99-105) 
3rd Claim Negligence (Complaint ffl[ 106-111) 
4th Claim Gross Negligence (Complaint ffi[ 112-115) 
5th Claim Negligent Supervision (Complaint ffi[116-121) 
1
 For purposes of this Motion only, the District assumes as true the facts stated in 
plaintiffs' Complaint. 
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6th Claim Negligent Failure to Train (Complaint ffi[ 122-127) 
8th Claim Negligent Entrustment (Complaint ffif 133-145) 
9th Claim Negligent Storage of a Handgun (Complaint ffl 146-152) 
10th Claim Respondeat Superior for the negligent actions of the 
District's employees. (Complaint^ 153-158) 
3. Plaintiffs also assert, as their 7th Claim, a claim based on the alleged violation of a 
criminal statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-509.5(1). Complaint ffi| 128-132. 
The District Approved the Use of the Gun 
4. In their Complaint, plaintiffs repeatedly allege that the gun that was discharged 
resulting in Tucker Thayer's death had been approved for use in the school production by both 
Officer Richan and Vice Principal Goulding: 
13. However, unlike other tragic shootings that have occurred at other schools in 
the past, the handgun that killed Tucker Thayer was at the school with the 
approval and support of the school fs employees and administration as well as the 
local police department. (Complaint *f 13, emphasis added.) 
22. Apparently believing that the handgun Mr. Eaton was proposing to use for 
the play was capable of only firing blanks, SRO Richan approved the use of the 
handgun on school property as long as an adult brought the weapon to school for 
rehearsals and performances; the weapon remained under the adult's control and 
in a locked container until it was to be used; and the weapon was only to be fired 
by the adult. (Complaint f 22, emphasis added.) 
30. Mr. Goulding also knew about and consented to the use of Mr. Amodt's 
dangerous weapon on school grounds. (Complaint •fl 30, emphasis added.) 
31. After Mr. Eaton spoke to SRO Richan regarding using Mr. Amodt's gun 
during the play, SRO Richan approached Mr. Goulding and told him about his 
(SRO Richan's) conversation with Mr. Eaton. SRO Richan told Mr. Goulding 
that he (SRO Richan) had authorized the gun to be used during the play and told 
Mr. Goulding the rules he had imposed for the use of the gun. (Complaint Tf 31, 
emphasis added.) 
4 
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32. Mr. Goulding agreed with SRO Richan and authorized the use of the gun 
during the play, so long as SRO Richan saw that the rules were followed. 
(Complaint f 32, emphasis added.) 
35. In response to Mrs. Amodt's questions, Mr. Goulding, on behalf of the 
District, authorized the use of the weapon for the production of "Oklahoma" 
under the conditions imposed by SRO Richan. (Complaint f 35, emphasis 
added.) 
The District's Approval Resulted in Plaintiffs' Damages 
5. Plaintiffs claim that by approving the use of the handgun, the defendants created a 
danger that ultimately resulted in Tucker Thayer's death. They expressly allege, as they must, 
that the District's approval of the use of the gun, was the "direct and proximate cause" of their 
damages. E.g., ComplaintIflf 77-78, 105, 111, 115, 121, 127,145, 152. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT IS IMMUNE FROM NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS UNDER § 63G-7-301(5)(c) 
The Washington County School District is a governmental entity. Complaint ^ 2; Utah 
Code Ann. § 63G-7-102(3) & (7)). Accordingly, plaintiffs' claims against the District are 
subject to the limitations of the Immunity Act. Under the Immunity Act, the District is immune 
whenever a plaintiffs injuries arise out of or in connection with the issuance of any "approval, 
order or other similar authorization." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(c). That is the case here. 
A. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
BARS THIS ACTION. 
The Utah Supreme Court applies a three-step approach to determine whether a 
governmental entity is entitled to immunity. Johnson v. Utah Dep't of Trans., 2006 UT 15, ^17, 
133 P.3d 402; Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. Dist., 849 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Utah 1993). The first 
5 
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step is to decide whether the activity involved is a governmental function that is entitled to 
blanket immunity. Here, plaintiffs have sued the District, whose actions are, by definition, 
"governmental functions" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-102(4). See also Tindley v. Salt 
Lake City Sch. DisL, 2005 UT 30, % 25, 116 P.3d 295 (public school's "extracurricular activities 
fall within the scope of a public school's traditional governmental immunity.") The second step 
is to determine if there is a statutory waiver of that immunity. The District admits, for purposes 
of this motion only, that there has been a waiver of immunity for negligence claims. E.g., Utah 
Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(4). 
The third step in the analysis, and the issue before this Court, is whether an exception to 
that waiver of immunity applies. Section 301 of the Immunity Act (Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-
301(5)) sets forth the various circumstances under which there are exceptions to the District's 
waiver of immunity - i.e., circumstances under which the legislature has deemed it necessary for 
governmental entities to retain their immunity. Relevant here is Section 63G-7-301(5)(c), which 
retains the District's sovereign immunity from suit when a plaintiffs injuries "arise[] out of, in 
connection with, or result[] from . . . (c) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, 
or by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke, any permit, license, certificate, 
approval, order, or similar authorization." Utah Code Ann., § 63G-7-301(5)(c) (emphasis 
added.) 
Under this exception, the District is immune from plaintiffs' claims for injuries that (i) 
arose out of, or occurred in connection with, or resulted from (ii) the issuance of an approval or 
similar authorization. Both of those elements are satisfied here. 
6 
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B. THE IMMUNITY ACT COVERS THE DISTRICT'S APPROVAL. 
The Immunity Act is clear and unequivocal; it applies to "any permit, license, certificate, 
approval, order or similar authorization." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(c) (emphasis added.) 
Here, the Complaint asserts that Vice Principal Goulding, "on behalf of the District, authorized 
the use of the weapon [on school premises] for the production of Oklahoma." Complaint % 35. 
Under the Immunity Act, any claim for any injury that flows from that approval or authorization 
is barred. 
In fact, the Utah Supreme Court has never rejected a permit or similar authorization from 
coverage under Section 301; instead, it has broadly applied this immunity.2 Most recently, in 
Moss v. Pete Suazo Athletic Comm % 2007 UT 99, 175 P.3d 1042, the Court applied this 
immunity to a State Boxing Commission decision allowing a boxing match to go forward, 
resulting in the death of a boxer. In rejecting the plaintiffs argument to narrow the immunity, 
the Court held: "This language is broad. It certainly is not restricted to those decisions that 
constitute licensing decisions per se. Rather, it extends to approvals and similar authorizations, 
such as the Athletic Commission's decision to allow [the boxer's] participation in the boxing 
match." 2007 UT 99, Tfl5 (emphasis added.) 
The same result should be reached here. The gravamen of plaintiff s claims is that the 
2
 E.g., DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 441 (Utah 1995) (barring claims arising out of the 
issuance of a building permit.); Gillman v. Dept. of Fin. Inst, 782 P.2d 506, 509 (Utah 1989) 
(barring claims relating to the State's actions in regulating two failed thrifts because the injuries 
"arose out of licensing decisions."); Hilton v. Borthick, 791 P.2d 504, 505 (Utah 1990) (same); 
Metropolitan Fin. Co. v. State Tax Comm 'n, 714 P.2d 293, 294 (Utah 1986) (immunity arising 
out of the issuance of a title certificate for a motor vehicle.) 
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District wrongfully allowed the gun to be used on school premises; stated differently, that the 
District should not have authorized the use of the gun for the play. The approval/authorization at 
issue in this case is precisely the type contemplated by the legislature in Section 301. The statute 
reflects a policy that the District, like other governmental entities, must be given the leeway to 
make approvals and authorizations in pursuit of its educational mandate. Vice Principal 
Goulding was asked to make an exception to the District policy, which prohibits students from 
having handguns on school property. E.g., Complaint, fflf 71-72. He used his discretion and 
allowed a gun that shot blanks to be used for sound effects for the play, provided that the parent 
gun owner, David Amodt, have sole control over the gun and not allow any student to handle the 
gun. Section 301 manifests the legislature's intent to allow the District to make such 
discretionary approvals by giving the District the concomitant protection against lawsuits arising 
therefrom. 
Just as the boxing commission was deemed immune for allowing a fight to take place in 
Moss, the District should be deemed immune for allowing the gun to be used for sound effects in 
a school play. 
C. THE CAUSAL ELEMENT HAS BEEN M E T . 
Vice Principal Goulding's decision to allow Mr. Amodt to use a gun on school property, 
subject to various conditions, is covered by Section 301. The District next needs to show the 
requisite causal link between the issuance of the approval or authorization and the plaintiffs' 
injuries. Because all of plaintiffs' injuries flow from that approval to use the gun, all of their 
negligence claims are barred. 
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For Section 301 immunity to apply, the injury must "arise out of, in connection with, or 
result from" the issuance of the approval/authorization. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5). The 
Utah Supreme Court has been clear and unequivocal that the phrase "arises out o f is broad and 
only requires "some causal relationship" or a "but for relationship" between the issuance of the 
permit and plaintiffs injuries. Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. DisL, 927 P.2d 159, 162 (Utah 1996); 
See also Blackner v. State, 2002 UT 44, f 8, 48 P.3d 949. 
Last year, the Utah Supreme Court in Hoyer v. State, 2009 UT 38, 212 P.3d 537, broadly 
applied the judicial proceeding immunity under Section 301(5)(e) and addressed the causal 
element required under Section 301. There, plaintiff sued the State for the value of his snakes 
that died after being seized and held as evidence pending Hoyer's criminal trial and successive 
appeals. Because the snakes were taken pursuant to a warrant issued as part of a criminal 
prosecution, the State was deemed immune from all claims - including claims relating to 
the care of the snakes years later - because the plaintiffs damages all arose out o/a judicial 
proceeding pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 63G-7-301(5)(e). Plaintiff argued that the construction 
of "arises out o f was overbroad and impractical, and should be changed to require something 
"more than 'but-for' causation because the 'but-for' test could provide immunity to the 
government for all negligent acts." 2009 UT 38, ^  28. But, the Court rejected the opportunity to 
narrow the Taylor standard: "As we have previously held, the test for whether an exception to 
the waiver of immunity for negligence applies is whether 'but for' the excepted act, the harm 
would not have occurred." 2009 UT 38, f 32, citing Taylor, 927 P.2d at 163. 
In their Complaint, plaintiffs' assert, as they must, that the District's actions in allowing 
9 
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the use of the gun was the proximate cause of their injuries. Fact f 6. For immunity purposes, 
all that is required is the far broader "but for" causal nexus. See, Taylor, Hoyer, supra. If there 
is proximate cause, it follows that there is but for cause. 
If Vice Principal Goulding had not approved the use of the gun, it would not have been 
allowed on school premises, would not have been in the hands of Tucker Thayer, and could not 
have caused his death. But for the District's approval of the use of the gun, plaintiffs would not 
have suffered any damages. All of plaintiffs' claims for damages arose out of the issuance of 
Vice Principal Goulding's authorization and are therefore barred by governmental immunity. 
II. THE SEVENTH CLAIM FAILS T O STATE A LEGALLY COGNIZABLE CLAIM. 
Plaintiffs' 7th Claim asserts a claimed based on an alleged violation of a criminal statute -
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-509.5(1). That statute makes it a misdemeanor to provide a handgun to 
a minor. Id. The plain language of that statute reflects no intent to create a civil claim for 
damages. Id. Without such an intention, there can be no claim for damages flowing from this 
enactment: "In the absence of language expressly granting a private right of action in the statue 
itself, the courts of this state are reluctant to imply a private right of action based on state law." 
Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12,1J 20, 66 P.3d 592 (no private right of action under Utah Code 
Ann. § 53A-7-202(l)). 
In fact, Utah courts do no create private rights of action based on criminal statutes. See 
Youren v. Tintic Sch. DisL, 2004 UT App 33,1|4, 86 P.3d 771 ("[w]hen a statute makes certain 
acts unlawful and provides criminal penalties for such acts, but does not specifically provide for 
a private right of action, we generally will not create such a private right of action.") 
10 
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The 7th claim fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. That claim should 
likewise be dismissed with prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the forgoing, the District respectfully requests that this Court dismiss, with 
prejudice, all of plaintiffs' state law claims against it based on governmental immunity. Only the 
first claim - a section 1983 claim - should survive this motion. 
Dated this 24th day of February, 2010. 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
/s/ Barry G. Lawrence 
BARRY G. LAWRENCE 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant Washington County 
School District 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 24th day of February, 2010,1 electronically filed the foregoing 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE DISTRICT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON 
THE PLEADINGS AS TO ALL STATE LAW CLAIMS, using the court's CM/ECF system, 
and that the same was electronically sent by the court's CM/ECF system to the following: 
Jeffrey C. Wilcox, Esq. 
John Collins, Esq. 
Gallian, Wilcox, Welker, Olson & Beckstrom, L.C. 
965 East 700 South Ste 305 
St. George, Utah 84790 
j wilcoxCatewwo. com 
Peter Stirba 
Bret W. Rawson 
Stirba & Associates 
215 South State St., Suite 750 
P.O. Box 810 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-0810 
peter^stirba. com 
David Wolf 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
dnwolf^utah. gov 
I si Danell Tanner 
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GALLIAN, WILCOX, 
WELKER, OLSON & BECKSTROM, L.C. 
Jeffrey C. Wilcox (4441) 
jwilcox@gwwo.com 
John L.Collins (10790) 
j collins@gwwo .com 
965 East 700 South, Suite 305 
St. George, Utah 84790 
Telephone: (435) 628-1682 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
RON THAYER and CATHIE THAYER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WASHINGTON COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, CITY OF ST. GEORGE, 
ROBERT GOULDING, MICHAEL EATON, 
STACY RICHAN, DAVID AMODT, JOHN 
and JANE DOES I-X, ABC 
CORPORATIONS I-X, and XYZ 
PARTNERSHIPS I-X, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
THE DISTRICT'S MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AS 
TO ALL STATE LAW CLAIMS 
Hearing Requested 
Case No. 2:09 cv565 
Judge Dee Benson 
Plaintiffs Ron and Cathie Thayer (collectively as "the Thayers"), by and through Counsel 
of record, hereby oppose Defendant Washington County School District's Motion for Judgment 
on the Pleadings as to All State Law Claims and respectfully pray for an Order denying the same. 
INTRODUCTION 
Tucker Thayer, a fifteen-year-old boy, died on November 18, 2008, as the direct result of 
the negligence of Washington County School District (the "District") and its employees, among 
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others. Even though the State of Utah has waived its sovereign immunity when governmental 
entities injure others, the District now claims that it is immune because it issued to itself a 
"permit" or a "license" to give a malfunctioning and deadly handgun to a teenager for use as 
nothing more than a sound effect in a school play. However, because the exception that the 
District seeks to hide behind applies only to governmental entities specifically charged with the 
responsibility to issue permits and licenses, and not to entities with the responsibility of 
educating children, the District's motion should be denied. 
RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Thayers make a general objection to the statement of facts alleged by the District. 
The facts alleged in the Complaint in the case at hand speak for themselves, and the Thayers 
hereby object to any mischaracterization of those facts by the District in its loose reference to 
various paragraphs of the Complaint. In any event, for the purposes of the District's Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings, the Court and the parties "must accept all well-pleaded allegations in 
the complaint as true and 'construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'" Mock v. 
T.G.&Y. Stores Co., 971 F.2d 522, 529 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 
994, 997 (10th Cir. 1991)). 
STATEMENT OF RELATED FACTS 
The Thayers incorporate their Complaint, and its allegations, into this Memorandum by 
reference, as if stated herein in full. Notwithstanding the same, and for convenience of the Court, 
the following facts should be considered: 
1. The Thayers are the parents of Tucker Thayer ("Tucker"), a fifteen-year-old child 
who was shot and killed with a handgun loaded with blanks on November 15, 2008, at his 
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school, Desert Hills High School ("Desert Hills"). {See Complaint \ 12, at 3, on file with the 
Court). 
2. Desert Hills is a secondary school owned and operated by Defendant Washington 
County School District ("District") in St. George, Utah. {See id. f 14). 
3. Defendant Michael Eaton ("Mr. Eaton") is an employee and agent of the District and 
was at all relevant times employed by the District as a theater teacher at Desert Hills. {See id. f 
17). 
4. Tucker was a student of Mr. Eaton and was involved in Desert Hills' production of 
"Oklahoma." (See id. ffif 16,18). 
5. Mr. Eaton decided to use a real handgun in the play, but not as an on-stage prop. Mr. 
Eaton wanted to actually fire a handgun, loaded with a blank round, in the theater as a sound 
effect. {See id. % 19). 
6. Before following through with his plan to use a real gun in connection with the play, 
Mr. Eaton discussed his plan with the in-house representative of the St. George Police 
Department ("SGPD"), School Resource Officer Stacy Richan ("SRO Richan"). {See id. % 20, at 
4). 
7. Apparently believing that the handgun Mr. Eaton was proposing to use for the play 
was capable of only firing blanks, SRO Richan approved the use of the handgun on school 
property as long as an adult brought the weapon to school for rehearsals and performances; the 
weapon remained under the adult's control and in a locked container until it was to be used; and 
the weapon was only to be fired by the adult. {See id. ^ 22). 
// 
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8. Defendant Robert Goulding, an Assistant Principal at Desert Hills, also knew about 
and consented to Mr. Eaton's plan to use a real handgun in the play. (See id. \% 30-35, at 5-6). 
9. SRO Richan, Mr. Goulding, and Mr. Eaton each failed to implement and enforce the 
rules SRO Richan set forth governing the use of the dangerous weapon. (See id. ^ 42, at 7). 
10. For instance, instead of having an adult supervise and control the gun before and 
during each rehearsal and/or performance, Tucker was allowed to control and use the gun with 
no adult supervision and even without any adult present. (See id. ffif 43-49). 
11. Mr. Eaton knew that Tucker had access to and control of the gun and had been firing 
the weapon during rehearsals and performances, but he took no action to stop him from hurting 
himself or anyone else. (Id. ^ 55, at 8). 
12. Indeed, Mr. Eaton encouraged Tucker's use of the weapon. In at least one instance, 
when the gun was fired on cue, Mr. Eaton told the stage manager, by two-way radio, "That was 
great! [Mr. Amodt] is my new best friend!" The stage manager replied by radio, "That was 
Tucker." Mr. Eaton responded, "Tell him he is my new favorite student." (Id. ^ 56). 
13. On November 15, 2008, the gun and three blanks were left in the sound booth without 
any adult supervision. (See id. % 62, at 9). 
14. An adult became concerned that Tucker might be planning a practical joke with the 
gun, such as firing the weapon at an inappropriate point in the play. However, nothing was said 
to Tucker, and the gun was left in the sound booth without adult supervision. (See id. ^ 63). 
15. Soon thereafter, the gun was discharged near Tucker's head. (See id. ^ 64). 
16. No adult was present in the sound booth when the gun discharged. (See id. f 65). 
// 
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17. Despite not having a bullet, the muzzle blast from the live blank drove skull 
fragments into Tucker's brain, and a "blowback" wound of approximately three inches in 
diameter was formed as a result of gases produced by the explosion of the gun powder exiting 
from the same hole they entered after being driven into Tucker's brain. {See id. fflf 68-69, at 10). 
18. Tucker died later that night {See id f 70). 
ARGUMENT 
This Court should deny the District's Motion because the State of Utah did not except 
schools from liability for giving children dangerous, malfunctioning handguns. The District does 
not dispute that the Governmental Immunity Act waives liability for negligence, but the 
District's argument, that it is immunized by the exception to the immunity waiver for authorities 
that issue permits and licenses, runs contrary to the interpretation given to the law by Utah courts 
and to the intent of the Utah Legislature. Specifically, the exceptions to the waiver of immunity 
can only be applied with respect to governmental entities that have legislative authority to 
participate in the excepted conduct. In essence, Utah courts have refused to allow governmental 
entities to escape liability under exceptions that have little, if anything, to do with the purpose of 
the entity. Finally, the District's interpretation of the waiver runs contrary to the Legislature's 
purpose in waiving immunity. Specifically, instead of "allowing] individuals to sue the 
government for its negligence, fiso as to make more justice,'" the District's interpretation would 
allow any governmental entity to "permit" itself to engage in negligent conduct, thereby 
immunizing itself from liability. See Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist, 927 P.2d 159, 168 (Utah 
1996) (Durham, J., dissenting). Because the District's interpretation defiles the plain language of 
the exception, because the District is not an entity charged with issuing "permits" or "licenses" 
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under Utah law, and because the District's interpretation would give individual governmental 
entities sweeping authority to undermine the purposes of the Governmental Immunity Act, the 
District's Motion should be denied. 
A, Standard. 
In the Tenth Circuit, a motion for judgment on the pleadings brought pursuant to Rule 
12(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is subject to the same, strict standard as a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim. Specifically, the Court must "accept all facts pleaded by the 
non-moving party as true and grant all reasonable inferences from the pleadings in favor of the 
same." Park Univ. Enterps., Inc. v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, PA, 442 F.3d 1239, 1244 (10th Cir. 
2006). Then, with all the facts being read in favor of the non-moving party, a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings "should not be granted 'unless the moving party has clearly 
established that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and the party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Any & All Radio Station 
Transmission Equip., 207 F.3d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 2000)). Because material issues of fact exist, 
and because the District has failed to satisfy its burden of proof, its motion should be denied. 
B. The State has Waived Immunity for the District's Negligence. 
The Utah Legislature has waived its common-law sovereign immunity for the District's 
negligence. Specifically, under Utah law, "[ijmmunity from suit of each governmental entity is 
waived as to any injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee 
committed within the scope of employment." Utah Code Ami. § 63G-7-301(4) (2009). The 
District does not dispute that, unless an exception from this waiver exists, it can be held liable for 
damages resulting from the negligent conduct causing Tucker Thayer's death. 
6 of 14 
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C. The District's Negligence is not Exempt from the State's Waiver of Immunity. 
The Legislature has not retained immunity for governmental entities under the facts that 
exist in this case. Specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(c) does not give the District free 
reign to injure students by "approving" its own negligent and/or reckless conduct. The statute in 
question protects the government from suits based on "the issuance, denial, suspension, or 
revocation of, or by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, license, 
certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization." Id. Contrary to the District's argument that 
this language grants it immunity any time it authorizes itself to take any action, courts 
interpreting this language have not applied it in such an alarmingly broad manner. 
Utah courts have rejected the attempts of school districts to expand the Governmental 
Immunity Act's ("GIA") exceptions to the extremes suggested by the District in this case. For 
instance, a school district installed a pipe and a mechanical blower to vent sewer gas close to the 
edge of its property and only seventeen feet from a neighboring home. See Lovendahl v. Jordan 
Sch. Dist, 2002 UT 130, ffl 6-7, 63 P.3d 705, 707-08 (plurality opinion). After the vented gas 
caused or aggravated an asthmatic condition and the school district refused to do anything to 
correct the problem it caused, the neighbors brought claims against the district for, among other 
things, nuisance. Id. ^ 6-8, 63 P.3d at 708. The school district claimed that it was immune from 
the damages caused by any emissions by a provision of the GIA immunizing governmental 
entities from "'activities of. . . regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or 
hazardous wastes.'" Id. Tf 10; see also Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(18)(c) (2002), now codified at 
II 
II 
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§ 63G-7-301(5)(s)(iii) (2010). After determining that the language of the Act was ambiguous,1 
Chief Justice Durham analyzed the legislative history of the act and concluded that, because 
school districts are not entities charged with the regulation of hazardous materials, the exception 
did not apply, noting that "specific exceptions to the waiver provisions in the Governmental 
Immunity Act apply only to state agencies responsible for providing public services that 
specifically relate to those exceptions." Id. % 33, 63 P.3d at 710. Therefore, the District in the 
case at hand can qualify under the exception applying to state agencies issuing "any permit, 
license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization" only if the District is an agency 
whose function is to issue permits, licenses, etc., to third parties. 
The plain language of the exception the District seeks to apply does not indicate that the 
Legislature intended to except a school district from its negligence in making any kind of 
approval. The applicable statutory language reads as follows: 
Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is not waived under Subsections 
(3) and (4) if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from: 
(c) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by the failure or refusal to 
issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or 
similar authorization. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(c). 
Two things prevent this language from being interpreted in the manner proposed by the 
District. First, the use of the word "issue" has a very official connotation, being defined as "to 
1
 In his opinion, Associate Chief Justice Durrant agreed that the intent of the legislature 
should be honored, but he failed to find the particular exception at issue in Lovendahl 
ambiguous. Therefore, he applied the intent of the legislature as expressed in the plain language 
of the statute. See Lovendahl, 2002 UT 130, \ 59, 63 P.3d at 718 (Durrant, J., concurring in the 
result). 
8 of 14 
Case 2:09-cv-00565-DB Document 29 Filed 03/24/10 Page 9 of 14 
put forth or distribute usually officially." See Merriam-Webster Online, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/issue (last accessed March 10, 2010). Second, the words "license," 
"certificate," "approval," "order," and "similar authorization" are used as nouns, meaning "a 
permission granted by competent authority to engage in a business or occupation or in an activity 
otherwise unlawful." See id., http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/license (last accessed 
March 10, 2010) (emphasis added); see also id., http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary 
/certificate (last accessed March 10,2010) (defining "certificate" as "a document containing a 
certified statement especially as to the truth of something; specifically: & document certifying 
that one has fulfilled the requirements of and may practice in a field"); id., http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/authorization (last accessed March 10, 2010) (defining "authorization" 
as "an instrument that authorizes"). As such, the statute excepts liability for an instrument that is, 
or is not, issued, or officially distributed, from a competent authority. 
A plain reading of the statute indicates that the Legislature intended to immunize 
governmental entities charged with issuing permits (such as building permits), licenses (such as 
licenses to engage in business), and certificates (such as marriage certificates) from any damages 
resulting from the issuance, or failure to issue, of such documents, and courts interpreting the 
statute have always applied it in such a manner. For instance, the exception shielded a county 
from immunity for issuing a temporary certificate of occupancy when necessary permits and 
inspections, including a building permit itself, had not been obtained or performed. See DeBry v. 
Salt Lake County, 835 P.2d 981, 982-83, 986-87 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).2 Moreover, there is a 
2
 Utah courts have applied the exception in a similar manner several other times. See, 
e.g., Hilton v. Borthick, 791 P.2d 504 (Utah 1989) (finding Utah State Department of Financial 
Institutions immune from its failure to revoke the license of a small loan business that the 
9 of 14 
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distinct difference between a governmental body approving the actions of third parties, i.e., 
issuing a certificate of occupancy or building permit, and the government authorizing itself to 
take negligent actions that injure innocent children. A school district's purpose, or function, is to 
educate our children, and to do so in a safe environment. It has no business issuing licenses or 
permits, especially to itself. The plain language, and the subsequent application, of this exception 
to the waiver of immunity provides for the immunity of a governmental entity actually involved 
in issuing permits, licenses, or certificates to approve the conduct of third parties, such as in the 
DeBry case, not for the conduct at issue in the case at hand. 
Although the District's interpretation of § 63G-7-301(5)(c) has not been raised to Utah's 
appellate courts, decisions from Utah courts support the conclusion that the District cannot take 
advantage of that exception because it is not an entity charged with issuing permits or licenses. 
When a school district installed a new parking lot, which caused rainwater to flood a neighboring 
property, and subsequent attempts to otherwise divert the rainwater failed, the property owner 
sued. See Williams v. Carbon County Bd. of Ed., 780 P.2d 816, 817 (Utah 1989). The school 
district claimed immunity pursuant to the exception for the "management of flood waters" and 
the "construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by [a] governmental entity." 
Id. at 818. The court, however, rejected the district's argument, noting that a "school district has 
no such statutory responsibility." Id. More specifically, the court rejected the suggestion that "it 
was the legislature's intention in enacting the [waiver] to shield defendant from possible liability 
Department knew was improperly treating debentures as deposit accounts); Gillman v. Dep 't of 
Fin. Inst, of State of Utah, 782 P.2d 506 (Utah 1989) (same); de Villiers v. Utah County, 882 
P.2d 1161 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (finding county immune from damages resulting from its 
approval of a PUD plat where the road design included a blind intersection, at which an accident 
later occurred). 
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for damages arising from its negligence in resurfacing its parking lot." Id. Because the waiver of 
immunity applied only to governmental entities charged with the responsibilities described in the 
waiver, the school district was not immune. Id.; see also Branam v. Provo Sch. Dist, 780 P.2d 
810, 812-13 (Utah 1989) (construing the term "governmental function" as including only 
conduct "undertaken in furtherance of the discharge of responsibilities assigned to the 
governmental entity). 
Furthermore, an argument almost identical to the District's argument in the case at hand, 
and dealing with a school district's ability to issue a "permit" or "license," was rejected out of 
hand in another jurisdiction. As discussed by an Illinois court, the female manager of a junior 
high school wrestling team brought suit against a school district after she was sexually assaulted 
by the wrestling coach. Mueller v. Cmty. Consol Sch. Dist. 54, 678 N.E.2d 660, 662 (111. Ct. 
App. 1997). The district argued that, because the coach was permitted or authorized to drive the 
victim home that it was immune pursuant to a provision of Illinois' immunity act, which reads as 
follows: 
A local public entity is not liable for an injury caused by the issuance, denial, 
suspension, revocation of, or by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or 
revoke, any permit, license, certificate, approval, order or similar authorization .. 
745 111. Comp. Stat. 10/2-104 (1994). The court easily rejected the district's argument, noting 
that "[bjecause no permit, license, certificate, approval, order or similar authorization is alleged 
to have caused injury in this case, section 2-104 does not provide the School District with tort 
immunity." Mueller, 678 N.E.2d at 666. Similarly, no permit or license was issued in the case at 
hand that would allow the District to immunize itself from liability for its own conduct. 
Therefore, its motion should be denied. 
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Public policy also runs contrary to the District's interpretation of § 63G-7-301(5)(c). The 
committee responsible for studying sovereign immunity in 1963 was almost unanimous in the 
conclusion that: 
governmental entities should be waived in relation to responsibility for the 
negligent acts or omissions of employees (tort liability) with the exception of 
intentional or willful misdeeds, discretionary acts and certain other activities 
where it was felt that it is in the best interest of the public to exclude 
responsibility. 
Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. DisL, 927 P.2d 159, 168 (Utah 1996) (Durham, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Utah Legislative Council, Report of the Governmental Immunity Committee, 67-68 (Dec. 
1964)). Indeed, the Legislature adopted the bill, "allowing] individuals to sue the government 
for its negligence, 'so as to make more justice.'" Id. 
The District's interpretation of the exception does not "make more justice," but, instead, 
effectively immunizes the government from any conduct. Specifically, if all that is required to 
bring a governmental entity's conduct within the section is for the school to "permit" itself to 
take a given course of action, then no negligence can be actionable. Any school district could 
issue a 'license" or "permit" to itself allowing its employees to commit any and all negligent 
acts. So, under the interpretation suggested by the District, a teacher could take a group of 
students on an outing and "permit" himself to drive drunk. If the teacher's drunk driving resulted 
in an accident that killed and maimed the students, the school would be immune from both the 
teacher's negligent approval and the negligent act itself. Such a result does not make "make more 
justice" and was not intended by the Legislature. Therefore, the District's interpretation of the 
exception should be rejected, and its motion should be denied. 
// 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should reject the District's attempts to undermine the GIA's purposes—and its 
clear language—but should, instead, apply the plain language of the exception as it is written. 
The District did not issue any "permit" or "license" in the case at hand, and if any permission 
was given, it was given with respect to the request of its own employee, Mr. Eaton, to use a gun 
in the production of "Oklahoma." Moreover, the District is not an entity charged with issuing the 
permits or licenses contemplated under the exception. The application suggested by the District 
in the case at hand, if accepted by the Court, would create a dangerous precedent allowing public 
entities to "license" their own negligence, completely negating the Legislature's intent to "make 
more justice." Therefore, and for all of the above and foregoing reasons, the Thayers respectfully 
request that this Court issue an order denying the District's Motion. 
DATED this of March, 2010. 
GALLIAN, WILCOX, 
WELKER, OLSON & BECKSTROM, L.C. 
Mfire/C. Wiled* 
OohsnL. Collins 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE UNITED STATE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
RON THAYER and CATHIE THAYER 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WASHINGTON COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, CITY OF ST. GEORGE, 
ROBERT GOULDING, MICHAEL 
EATON, STACY RICHAN, DAVID 
AMODT, JOHN and JANE DOES I-X, 
ABC CORPORATIONS I-X, and XYZ 
PARTNERSHIPS I- X, 
Defendants. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF THE DISTRICT'S MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AS 
TO ALL STATE LAW CLAIMS 
Case No. 2:09 cv565 
Judge Dee Benson 
Defendant Washington County School District (the "District"), through its counsel Barry 
G. Lawrence, Assistant Utah Attorney General, files this reply memorandum in support of its 
motion for judgment on the pleadings seeking the dismissal of all state law claims against it. 
Case 2:09-cv-00565-DB Document 32 Filed 04/05/10 Page 2 of 13 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs assert negligence claims against the District seeking damages for the death of 
their son, Tucker Thayer, who was killed with a gun filled with blanks that had been approved 
for use as a sound effect for a school play. The District seeks an Order dismissing all negligence 
claims based on Section 301(5)(c) of the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah (the "Immunity 
Act"), which immunizes all governmental entities from any claim for injury that "arises out o f 
the "issuance . . . [of] any permit, license, certificate, approval, order or similar authorization" 
See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(c)(emphasis added.) 
Based on the allegations of plaintiffs' Complaint (and as confirmed in plaintiffs 
responsive memorandum (see Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts, ffl| 7 & 8)), plaintiffs' claims for 
damages all undisputedly arose out of the school district's approval of the use of a gun for sound 
effects in a school play. E.g. Complaint, fflf 13, 22, 30, 31, 32, 35. Based on the plain language 
of Section 301, the District is entitled to immunity. 
In response, plaintiffs make two arguments — both of which have been previously 
rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. First, they argue that this immunity should only apply to 
agencies "whose function is to issue permits, licenses, etc., to third parties." PI. Memo, at 8. In 
making this argument, plaintiffs misleadingly rely on Justice Durham's minority opinion in 
Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch. Dist., 2002 UT 130, 63 P.3d 705, and completely ignore Justice 
Durrant's majority opinion, which expressly rejected that exact argument. In fact, the law in 
Utah is quite clear - immunity applies equally to any governmental agency. 
Plaintiffs next argue that this immunity should apply to only the issuance of "formal" 
2 
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permits, licenses and certificates. PI. Memo, at 9, 13. That argument ignores the plain language 
of the statute, and is at odds with the holding in Moss v. Pete Suazo Athletic Comm % 2007 UT 
99, 175 P.3d 1042, where the Supreme Court applied this immunity in a case that involved an 
approval that was not a formal permit, license, or certificate. Notably, plaintiffs do not even 
address, let alone attempt to distinguish, the Moss decision. 
Based on the Complaint's allegations, plaintiffs' damages claims all arose out of the 
District's approval to use a gun as a sound effect in a school play. But for the approval of the 
gun, the plaintiffs would not have suffered any damage. The District is immune from all claims 
of negligence.1 
ARGUMENT 
As the District mentioned in its opening memorandum, there is a three-step approach to 
determining whether a governmental entity is entitled to immunity. There is no dispute here as 
to the first two steps; the only issue before this Court relates to the third - i.e., whether the 
District enjoys immunity under one of the circumstances listed in Section 301(5) of the 
Immunity Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5). Under that provision any governmental 
entity is immune from suit if a plaintiff s injuries "arise[] out of, in connection with, or result[] 
from . . . (c) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by the failure or refusal to 
issue, deny, suspend or revoke, any permit, license, certificate, approval order, or similar 
1
 The District also moved to dismiss the Seventh Claim - based on an alleged violation 
of a criminal statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-509.5(1) - because there is no private right of 
action for such a claim. Plaintiffs have not responded to that argument and so the 7th claim 
should be dismissed with prejudice. 
3 
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authorization^ Utah Code Ann., § 63G-7-301(5)(c) (emphasis added.) Thus, the District is 
immune from plaintiffs' claims for injuries that (i) arose out of, or occurred in connection with, 
or resulted from (i.e., "but for") (ii) the issuance of an approval or similar authorization. The 
plaintiffs do not contest that the requisite causal link has been met. So, the only issue for this 
Court is whether the District's approval of the use of the gun is covered by Section 301(5)(c). 
The plain language of the statute, and the corresponding case law, demonstrate that the immunity 
applies here. 
A. Plaintiffs' Reliance on the Minority Position in Lovendahl Ignores The 
Majority Opinion and Other Supreme Court Precedent 
Plaintiffs argue first that the District cannot avail itself of the Section 301(5)(c) immunity 
because it is not "an agency whose function is to issue permits, licenses, etc. to third parties," 
(PL Memo, at 8) relying on Justice Durham's opinion in Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch. DisL, 2002 
UT 130, 63 P.3d 705. But, plaintiffs discussion about Lovendahl is misleading. The majority 
opinion, drafted by Justice Durrant, expressly rejected the very argument plaintiffs raise here. 
Justice Durham wrote for a minority of the Court; this Court should not follow her opinion. 
In Lovendahl, a school district was sued by a neighboring landowner because a school 
was emitting hydrogen sulfide due to a backed up sewage system. The district sought summary 
judgment based on one of the immunities contained in Section 63-30-102 - which provided 
immunity "for all governmental entities" for claims that arise out of "regulating, mitigating or 
handling hazardous wastes." Justice Durrant, writing for the majority, held that because the 
2
 Lovendahl applied the predecessor statute - Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(18)(c)(1997) 
- that is identical to the current statute, Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7- 301(5)(p)(iii). 
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immunity expressly applied to "all governmental entities," the statute was clear and 
unambiguous; it applied not only to entities who were involved in the regulation of hazardous 
wastes, but also to entities such as school districts. Id. at f58. 
Justice Durham, writing for only herself and Justice Howe, took the position that even 
though the statute on its face applied to "all governmental entities" {id. at TJ22), it would be 
"unreasonable" to construe the statute so broadly and required them "to look beyond the plain 
language of the statute" and examine the legislative history of hazardous waste statutes. Id. at 
\2A. She concluded that the immunity should not apply to the district because it did "not have 
statutory responsibility for handling, mitigating, or disposing of hazardous wastes." Id. at f47. 
Justice Durrant and the majority of the Court (he was joined by Justices Russon and 
Wilkins) disagreed with Justice Durham's position. Justice Durrant held that the immunity 
statute should be applied consistently to all governmental entities, not just to entities responsible 
for regulating hazardous waste. He relied on basic rules of statutory construction in criticizing 
Justice Durham's opinion: 
The [minority opinion] in effect, amends the statute to read that immunity is retained for 
governmental entities that cause injury while 'regulating, mitigating, or handling 
hazardous materials or hazardous wastes, provided the agency is responsible for 
providing public services that specifically relate to those exceptions.' While this addition 
to the statutory language may well be good policy, it does not change the fact that such 
language is not in the statute. If the legislature had intended to limit immunity to only 
those governmental entities that are "responsible for providing public services that 
specifically relate to those exceptions, " it would not have used the word "all " Because 
the plain language of the statute provides immunity to all governmental entities when the 
injury arises out of any of the enumerated exceptions, there is no need to look any 
further. The lead opinion does so, however, and is thereby led to unnecessarily read 
additional terms into the statute. 
Id. a t f l 57-58 (emphasis added.) 
5 
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In fact, other Supreme Court cases have held that "the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 
especially section 63-30-10 [the predecessor to Section 310], focuses on the conduct or situation 
out of which the injury arose, not on the status of the party inflicting the injury" S.H. v. State, 
865 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Utah 1993)(emphasis added.) For this reason, the Utah Supreme Court has 
determined that the statutory immunity for intentional assaults or batteries (currently found in 
Section 301(5)(b)) immunizes governmental entities even when the actor is not a governmental 
employee. Here again, Justice Durham took the minority position and opined that an entity 
should be immune only if an assault or battery was committed by a government actor. Taylor v. 
Ogden Sck Dist., 927 P.2d 159, 165 (Utah 1996)(Durham J., dissenting). Notably, plaintiffs cite 
to Justice Durham's dissent in Taylor on page 12 of their memorandum, again relying on a 
minority view of the Utah Supreme Court. 
Plaintiffs also rely on two cases that were cited in Lovendahl in which school districts 
were sued by nearby landowners for water flowing from the district property. See Williams v. 
Carbon County Bd. ofEduc, 780 P.2d 816 (Utah 1989)(where a school district resurfaced its 
parking lot, causing water to runoff); Branam v. Provo Sch. Dist., 780 P.2d 810 (Utah 
1989)(where a school pumped water out of its basement which caused an adjoining landowner's 
property to flood.) In each case, the District argued for immunity because the claims arose out of 
the "management of flood water" and/or the "operation of flood and storm systems," citing a 
prior statute, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3(4). The Court rejected immunity in Williams because 
the "district was engaged in resurfacing a parking lot, not in managing flood waters." Id. at 818. 
In Branam, the Court also rejected immunity because the school district was acting "like any 
6 
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other property owner seeking to avoid damage to its property." Id. at 812. 
Although Justice Durham relied on those cases in Lovendahl, again, the majority 
disagreed that they were applicable. Justice Durrant was "unwilling to extend" the holdings in 
Williams and Branam to Lovendahl, because they "dealt with the language of a different statute." 
Id. at f59, fii.2. In fact, the statute in those two cases was in a different section of the Immunity 
Act (Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3) and not in the section that contained the enumerated list of 
immune circumstances and the introductory clause that required the immunity to be applied to 
"all governmental entities." See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10. 
The plain language of the Immunity Act, and the majority of the Supreme Court, 
demands that the Immunity Act be applied equally to "all governmental entities." There is 
immunity anytime a plaintiffs claim arises out of an approval or authorization by a government 
actor. The statute does not state, and does not require, that the party seeking immunity be "an 
agency whose function is to issue permits, licenses, etc." PL Memo at 8. This Court should hold, 
just as Justice Durrant did in Lovendahl, that the Immunity Act applies equally to all 
governmental entities, and thus broadly covers the actions of the District in this matter. 
B. According to the Plain Language of the Statute, This Immunity Applies to 
More than Just Permits and Licenses. 
Next, plaintiffs seek to limit the immunity to formal license and permitting procedures, 
and to read the other terms out of the statute. Again, the statute provides for immunity for any 
claim for damages arising out of the issuance of "any permit, license, certificate, approval, 
order, or similar authorization." Utah Code Ann., § 63G-7-301(5)(c) (emphasis added.) 
Plaintiffs effectively ask this Court to ignore the italicized words, yet provide no tenable 
7 
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explanation for doing so. In fact, on numerous occasions in their memorandum, plaintiffs refer 
to only "licenses and permits" when addressing the issue: PI. Memo at 2 (this exception "applies 
only to governmental entities specifically charged with the responsibility to issue permits and 
licenses."); PI. Memo at 5-6 ("the District is not an entity charged with issuing 'permits' or 
'licenses' under Utah law."); PL Memo at 9 ("A plain reading of the statute indicates the 
Legislature intended to immunize governmental entities charged with issuing permits (such as 
building permits), licenses (such as licenses to engage in business) and certificates (such as 
marriage certificates)...")3 
The statute here expressly applies to not only licenses, permits, and certificates, but also 
to approvals, orders, or similar authorizations. This Court cannot adopt an interpretation that 
reads those terms out of the statute. Hoyer v. State, 2009 UT 38, % 22, 212 P.3d 547 ("In 
conducting a textual analysis, we consider the literal meaning of each term and 'avoid 
interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative.'") 
State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123,1f 52, 63 P.3d 621 ("When reading the statutory language, our 
purpose is to render all parts of the statute relevant and meaningful, and thus, we presume the 
legislature used each term advisedly and according to its ordinary meaning. As a result, we 
avoid interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative." (citations 
omitted.) Those terms must have some meaning, and must allow immunity beyond formal 
3
 Moreover, on page 9 of plaintiffs' memorandum, plaintiffs rely on an online dictionary 
to define the terms license, certificate, and authorization, but they utterly ignore the term 
"approval" which is the term used in their Complaint, and the term on which the District 
principally relies herein. 
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licensure and permitting procedures. 
In making this statutory construction argument, plaintiffs also ignore the most recent case 
interpreting this section of the Immunity Act, which the District cited in its opening 
memorandum - Moss v. Pete Suazo Athletic Comm 'n, 2007 UT 99, 175 P.3d 1042. Moss 
involved a State Boxing Commission decision allowing a boxing match to go forward, which 
resulted in the death of a boxer; it did not involve a formal peraiitting process, nor did it involve 
the issuance of a boxing license. There, plaintiff made the same argument plaintiffs make here 
(i.e., that the immunity should be narrowly construed to apply only to permits and licenses) but 
the Utah Supreme Court disagreed and held: "This language is broad. It certainly is not 
restricted to those decisions that constitute licensing decisions per se. Rather, it extends to 
approvals and similar authorizations, such as the Athletic Commission's decision to allow [the 
boxer's] participation in the boxing match." Id. at [^15 (emphasis added.) 
In light of the Moss case, plaintiffs simply cannot argue that this immunity should be 
narrowly construed. This immunity statute applies to all approvals, and according to plaintiffs' 
Complaint, this case undisputedly arises out of an approval. The statute thus provides immunity 
to the District here. 
C. Plaintiffs' Remaining Points Are Not Persuasive. 
Plaintiffs also argue that immunizing the District here "effectively immunizes the 
government from any conduct." PL Memo at 12. Plaintiffs often make such assertions in 
response to immunity arguments; in fact the plaintiff in Hoyer made that very same argument, 
claiming that too broad a reading of the statute would lead to immunizing "every government 
9 
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action." Hoyer, 2009 UT 38, «|[ 27. The Court rejected such hyperbole: "our case law shows that 
their fear - that the government will be immune from all acts of negligence - is unfounded." Id., 
1129. 
Plaintiffs also contend that a school district could simply argue any time it is sued that it 
"permitted itself to take a [negligent] course of action." PL Memo at 12. As an example, they 
say that if a teacher who drives students on a trip is sued for driving drunk, the district can 
simply argue that the teacher permitted himself to drive drunk. Id. That analogy is absurd. The 
District is not making such a claim and does not ask this Court for such a broad construction. 
Here, the gravamen of plaintiffs' claim - as plainly stated in plaintiffs' Complaint - is that the 
District was negligent in approving the use of the gun. But for that approval, the damage would 
have occurred. In the hypothetical, there was no approval, and certainly a plaintiffs complaint 
would not plead that such an approval was the cause of their claims.4 
Finally, plaintiffs infer that applying immunity here would be against the interests of 
justice. Here, the legislature has set the policy - that whenever a governmental entity undertakes 
its discretion to issue an approval, its actions shall be immune and not subject to civil tort 
liability. The legislature saw fit to immunize such actions, in order to protect the State's coffers. 
As a result, some plaintiffs will be barred from pursuing civil claims. Indeed, the Utah Supreme 
Court has upheld immunity and barred claims in cases involving injuries and damages just as 
4
 Plaintiffs also rely on a mid-level Illinois appellate court case, Mueller v. Community 
Consol Sch. Dist, 678 N.E.2d 660 (111. App. 1997). However, in that case, unlike this one, 
plaintiff never alleged in its complaint that a permit, license, or approval caused injury, and so 
there was no immunity. Id. at 346. The face of plaintiffs' Complaint in this case, however, 
plainly states those predicate facts. 
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serious as in this case. See Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500 (Utah 1996) (where the State was 
immune from claims brought by the family members of two women who were shot and killed by 
walkaways from a state-owned halfway house because the claims arose out of an assault and 
battery); S.H. v. State, 865 P.2d 1363 (Utah 1993) (where a school district was immune where a 
cab driver, hired by the State School for the Deaf and Blind, molested a student because the 
claims arose out of an assault and battery.) 
CONCLUSION 
The allegations of plaintiffs' Complaint make clear that their injuries arise out of the 
District's approval of the use of a gun for sound effects in a school play. The immunity statute 
clearly and unambiguously provides for immunity in this instance. Both the statute's plain 
language and the corresponding case law from the Utah Supreme Court, supports the District's 
immunity from negligence claims herein. 
The District respectfully requests that this Court dismiss, with prejudice, all of plaintiffs' 
state law claims against it and allow the case to proceed only as to plaintiffs' section 1983 claim. 
11 
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Dated this 5^ day of April, 2010. 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
/s/ Barry G. Lawrence 
BARRY G. LAWRENCE 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant Washington County 
School District 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
RON THAYER and CATHIE THAYER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WASHINGTON COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, CITY OF ST. GEORGE, 
ROBERT GOULDING, MICHAEL EATON, 
STACY RICHAN, DAVJD AMODT, JOHN 
and JANE DOES I-X, ABC 
CORPORATIONS I-X, and XYZ 
PARTNERSHIPS I-X, 
Defendants. 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO THE DISTRICT'S 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE 
PLEADINGS AS TO ALL STATE LAW 
CLAIMS 
Civil No. 2:09 cv565 
Judge Dee Benson 
Due to the mistaken belief that some case law cited in their Memorandum in Opposition 
to the District's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to All State Law Claims was a plurality 
opinion, as opposed to a dissenting opinion, the Thayers respectfully submit this Supplemental 
// 
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Memorandum to clarify Utah law on the subject and to assist the Court in determining the law 
applicable to the District's Motion. 
ARGUMENT 
The District's claim of immunity is misplaced because the statute on which it relies, by 
its terms, does not apply to the circumstances in this case. The conduct that the District engaged 
in does not constitute "the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of.. . any permit, license, 
certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(c) (2009). 
To permit, license, approve, order, or authorize oneself to take any particular action is nothing 
more than making a decision. This case involves the District's decision to use a malfunctioning 
handgun in the production of a play and its decision to leave the gun in Tucker's possession for 
his use. The District argues that because it "approved" its own use of the handgun for the play, it 
is immune. However, in no case cited by the District has any court determined that a 
governmental entity was immune because it "approved" itself to engage in negligent conduct, 
and the Thayers have found no such case. Instead, every case cited by the District involves 
permits, licenses, certificates, approvals, orders, or other authorizations given from governmental 
entities to third parties, not to themselves. See, e.g., Moss v. Pete Suazo Athletic Comm 'n, 2007 
UT 99, 175 P.3d 1042 (involving governmental entity's approval of a boxer's participation in a 
boxing match); DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428,441 (Utah 1995) (barring claims related to a 
governmental entity's issuance of a building permit to another party); Gillman v. Dep 't of Fin. 
Inst, 782 P.2d 506, 509 (Utah 1989) (relating to a governmental entity's licensing of a financial 
institution); Hilton v. Borthick, 791 P.2d 504, 505 (Utah 1990) (same); Metropolitan Fin. Co. v. 
State Tax Comm 'n, 714 P.2d 293, 294 (Utah 1986) (holding government immune from claims 
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arising from its issuance of a title certificate to a third party); see also, e.g., de Villiers v. Utah 
County, 882 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (holding government immune for negligent 
approval of plat proposed by developer); DeBry v. Salt Lake County, 835 P.2d 981, 986 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992) (finding government immune from claim for negligently issuing a temporary 
certificate of occupancy for the property). 
A different statute applies when a governmental entity is sued based on decisions that it 
makes. Specifically, when the government makes a decision to engage in, or not to engage in, a 
discretionary function, it is immune. Utah Code Aim. § 63G-7-301(5)(a). Utah courts have 
described the discretionary functions for which the government is immune as "those requiring 
evaluation of basic governmental policy matters and do not include acts and decisions at the 
operational level, namely, those everyday, routine matters not requiring evaluation of broad 
policy factors." Johnson v. Utah Dep }t ofTransp., 2006 UT 15, \ 31, 133 P.3d 402, 409 (quoting 
Nelson ex rel Stuckman v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 575 (Utah 1996)). The court went on to 
explain that the government has immunity when it makes policy but that the "'exception is not 
extended to the ministerial implementation of that basic policy.'" Id. (quoting Carroll v. State, 
496 P.2d888, 891 (Utah 1972); and citing Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117, 1120 (Utah 1975)). 
In the case at hand, the policy regarding guns at schools was set by the Utah Legislature. 
In the State of Utah, "[a] minor under 18 years of age may not possess a handgun." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-509.4(1). Beyond that, Utah prohibits individuals from providing a handgun to a 
minor and specifically prohibits the possession of handguns on school property. Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 76-10-509.5(1), -505.5(1). The District, through its School Board, has adopted policy in line 
with the Legislature's pronouncement. Specifically, the District's Safe Schools Policy mandates 
3 of 9 
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a student's suspension or expulsion for "any serious violation occurring . . . in a school building, 
in or on school property, or in conjunction with any school activity, including: . . . [possession, 
control, or actual or threatened use of a real weapon .. .." (Washington County School District 
Policy and Procedure, "Safe Schools Policy," §§ 3.2.2.1, 3.2.2.1.1 (available at http://www4 
.washlcl2.org/district/districtjpolicy/2000/2110_safe__schoolsjpolicy.htm, last accessed May 3, 
2010)). The policy further specifies that for the possession, control, use, or threatened use of a 
real firearm on school property, or in connection with a school activity, mandates expulsion 
"from school for a period of not less than one year," subject to a hearing and review by the 
superintendant or his designee. (Id. §§ 3.2.2.3-3.2.2.3.2.3). 
The District has also established the manner in which it establishes broad policy matters, 
such as could be subject to the discretionary function exception to the waiver immunity. 
Specifically, the District's own policies indicate that its policies, which it defines as "a guide for 
action" that "should be narrow enough to give clear guidance to the administration but broad 
enough to allow discretion in meeting individual circumstances." (Id. § 2.1.2, available at 
http://www4.washkl2.org/district/district_policy/0000/000ljpolicy__and_jprocedure.htm, last 
accessed May 4, 2010). Moreover, "[pjolicy is adopted by the Board of Education" after initial 
presentation of the policy to the board, consideration and recommendation by the superintendant, 
discussion by the board, and generally thirty days. (Id. §§ 2.1.3, 2.3). In light of the policy-level 
decision already adopted and implemented by the District, its decision to use a real handgun in 
the production of "Oklahoma" is merely a "decision[ ] at the operational level," a "matter[ ] not 
requiring evaluation of broad policy factors" and is not subject to the discretionary function 
exception to the waiver of governmental immunity. Johnson, 2006 UT 15, % 31, 133 P.3d at 409 
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(quoting Nelson, 919 P.2d at 575). As such, the District is liable for its decision, and the Court 
should deny the District's attempt to characterize its decision as a permit or license. 
The distinction between a governmental body approving, permitting, or licensing the 
conduct of a third party, versus approving, permitting, or licensing its own conduct, is supported 
by analogy under Utah law. Specifically, Utah courts have made a distinction between 
inspections by the government of properties owned by third parties and of properties owned by 
the government See, e.g., Ilott v. Univ. of Utah, 2000 UT App. 289, 12 P.3d 1101; Ericksen v. 
Salt Lake City Court, 858 P.2d 995, 997-98 (Utah 1993) (noting, in dicta, that an inspector 
"served as an inspector for the City as the owner of the property and as a party to the 
construction contract," not as "a city inspector who inspects construction on private property for 
compliance with building, fire, electric, and other safety codes," before holding that the 
government was not immune for its inspector's negligence, and noting "that the legislature 
intended to preserve a narrow immunity for inspections"); Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 898 
P.2d 265,270-71 (Utah 1995) (holding that negligent inspection of equipment causing a 
plaintiffs injury did not "fall into the 'narrow immunity for inspections5" as the failure to 
maintain the equipment was not a regulatory activity to which the exception could apply). 
In the Ilott case, a spectator at a football game was injured when a wooden plank broke 
under her weight as she walked down some bleachers, and she brought claims against the 
university for negligence. Ilott, 2000 UT App. 289,1f 2, 12 P.3d at 1012. The university argued 
that it was immune from the spectator's claims because the "negligence claim arose from either 
an 'inadequate' inspection of the bleachers by the University or the 'latent defective condition' 
of the bleachers." Id. ^  3. On appeal, the court cited the holding of the Ericksen court, which 
5 of 9 
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noted "'that the legislature intended to preserve a narrow immunity for inspections' in the Act," 
reiterating the opinion that "the concept that immune inspections are those in which the 
government inspects a third party's property for code compliance." Id. ffij 9-10, 12 P.3d at 1013. 
Specifically, the provision of the GIA immunizing governmental entities from damages resulting 
from "a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or negligent inspection" 
provides immunity only for "regulatory activities." Id. \ 10. Because the university's negligent 
inspection of the bleachers was not performed "for compliance with safety codes," it "was not 
engaging in a 'regulatory activity' when its crew inspected the bleachers for defects." Zs?. If 14,12 
P.3datl014. 
The Utah Supreme Court reached a similar result in Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp, 898 
P.2d 265 (Utah 1995). An employee of a janitorial company providing contract services to the 
city at the airport sued the city after it failed to properly inspect, and negligently failed to detect 
the dangerous condition of, equipment owned by the city but used by the employee for his job. 
Id. at 267. The court rejected the city's argument that the injury was the result of a negligent 
inspection. Specifically, the court stated that the exception was based on the public duty 
doctrine,1 which "cdisallow[s] recovery by individuals for such inspections on the ground that the 
[inspection] was intended to protect the general public . .. rather than to protect a particular 
1
 Although the issue has not been explored by Utah courts, other American jurisdictions 
have found the public duty doctrine as the guiding light with respect to permit and licensing 
decisions. See, e.g., Thelen v. City of Elba, Civil No. 08-1150 (JNE/JJG), 2010 WL 1507622, 
*7-*8 (D. Minn. March 4, 2010) (slip copy) (citing Klingner v. City ofBraham, 130 F. Supp. 2d 
1068, 1072-73 (D. Minn. 2001)); Pande Cameron & Co. of Seattle v. C Puget Sound Reg. 
Transit Auth., 610 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1311 (W.D. Wash. 2009); Greggv. City of Kansas City, 
272 S.W.3d 353, 362-63 (Mo. Ct App. 2008); Nelson v. State, 195 P.3d 293, 300-03 (Mont. 
2008). As such, the analysis given by Utah courts with respect to inspections, the immunity for 
which also arises from the public duty doctrine, should apply. 
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individual or class of individuals.'" Id. at 271 (quoting 57A Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 376 
(1989)). Therefore, by extension, a municipality may be liable under the doctrine if it owes a 
duty to a particular individual or class of individuals. 
In the case at hand, the District owed a duty to Tucker, and to his parents, that removes 
its conduct from the protection of the public duty doctrine. Specifically, because Tucker was 
fatally injured at a school activity, on school property, during the time and at the place 
appropriate for the school activity, the District stood in loco parentis to Tucker. Utah courts have 
noted that a party who stands in loco parentis, or "in the place of a parent," "is one who has 
assumed the status and obligations of a parent without adoption," and "the rights and liabilities 
arising out of that relation are, as the words imply, exactly the same as between parent and 
child." Searle v. Searle, 2001 UT App 367, % 36 n.ll, 38 P.3d 307, 319 (quoting Gribble v. 
Gribble, 583 P.2d 64, 66 (Utah 1978), abrogated on other grounds, Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 
20, Tf 26, 154 P.3d 808, 814-15). More specifically, by taking custody of a child from his parents 
during school activities, the child is "'deprived . . . of the protection [from] his parents or 
guardian. Therefore, [it] . . . is properly required to give him the protection which [he has lost].'" 
Young v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist9 2002 UT , \ 14, 52 P.3d 1230, 1233 (quoting Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 320 cmt. b (1965)). Because the District owed a duty to Tucker and his 
parents individually, and not to the general public, the public duty doctrine does not apply, and 
the exception to the waiver of immunity the District seeks to apply in this case is inapplicable. 
Therefore, the Court should deny the District's Motion, 
\\ 
\\ 
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CONCLUSION 
For the above and foregoing reasons, the Thayers respectfully request that this Court 
deny the District's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to All State Law Claims and for any 
further relief deemed just and equitable under the circumstances. 
DATED this / / f k day of May, 2010. 
GALLIAN, WILCOX, 
WELKER, OLSON & BECKSTROM, L.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE UNITED STATE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
RON THAYER and CATHIE THAYER 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WASHINGTON COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, CITY OF ST. GEORGE, 
ROBERT GOULDING, MICHAEL 
EATON, STACY RICHAN, DAVID 
AMODT, JOHN and JANE DOES I-X, 
ABC CORPORATIONS I-X, and XYZ 
PARTNERSHIPS I- X, 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF CERTIFICATION OF 
QUESTION OF STATE LAW 
Case No. 2:09 cv 565 
Judge Dee Benson 
Pursuant to Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah, hereby enters this order certifying an uncertain question of Utah 
law to the Utah Supreme Court. 
Undisputed Factual Background:1 
In the Fall of 2008, the Desert Hills High School (DHHS) drama department performed 
the play "Oklahoma." Complaint f^ 18. DHHS is administered by the St. George School District 
1
 This matter came before this court on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
Accordingly, these facts are all taken from plaintiffs Complaint and are stipulated to by the 
parties as undisputed for the purpose of this Certification of Question of State Law. 
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(the "District"). Complaint U 14. Michael Eaton was the theater teacher and a District 
employee. Complaint f^ 17. To enhance the sound effects, Mr. Eaton wanted to shoot blanks 
from a real handgun instead of a prop gun. Complaint 119. But school policy prohibited 
anyone from possessing a gun on school premises. Complaint ^ 20. Accordingly, Mr. Eaton 
"consulted with the in-house representative of the St. George Police Department, School 
Resource Officer (SRO) Stacy Richan." Complaint f 20. "SRO Richan approved the use of the 
handgun on school property" subject to three conditions: I) only an adult could bring the weapon 
to and from school; ii) the weapon must remain in a locked container and under the adult's 
control at all times; and iii) only the adult was authorized to fire the weapon. Complaint <f 22. 
David Amodt, the father of the student stage manager Sarah Amodt, offered his Smith & 
Wesson .38 caliber, six shot revolver to be used in the play. Complaint ff 24-25. After Eaton 
spoke to SRO Richan regarding using Mr. Amodt's gun during the play, SRO Richan 
approached the DHHS Vice Principal, Robert Goulding, and told him "that he (SRO Richan) had 
authorized the gun to be used during the play and told Mr. Goulding the rules he had imposed for 
the use of the gun." Complaint Tf 31. "Mr. Goulding agreed with SRO Richan and authorized 
the use of the gun during the play, so long as SRO Richan saw the rules were followed" 
Complaint ^ 32. 
In fact, the conditions were not implemented. Complaint fl 42-46. Tucker Thayer was 
permitted to handle and fire the weapon outside the presence of Mr. Amodt or any other adult. 
Complaint fj[ 46-64. On November 15, 2008, prior to one of the performances, the gun was 
discharged near Tucker's head. Complaint «f 64. No adult was present in the sound booth when 
2 
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the gun discharged. Complaint f^ 65. Tucker died as a proximate result of the discharge. 
Complaint f 70. The Complaint alleges that the District's conduct was the "direct and proximate 
cause" of their damages. E.g., Complaint ff 77-78, 105, 111, 115, 121, 127, 145, 152. 
Procedural Background: 
Plaintiffs, Tucker Thayer's parents, have asserted a variety of claims against the District, 
two District employees (the drama teacher (Michael Eaton) and the Vice Principal (Robert 
Goulding)), St. George City and a City employee (Stacy Richan.)2 Plaintiffs' Complaint asserts 
both state law negligence/wrongful death claims and federal civil rights claims (pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983) against the various defendants.3 
The District filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to dismiss all state law claims (i.e., negligence claims) 
against it based on governmental immunity. The District argues that, based on the allegations in 
the Complaint, plaintiffs' claims arise out of the District's approval of the use of the gun, which 
constitutes an immune activity under Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(c) of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. That statute in relevant part provides: 
(5) Immunity is not waived . . . . if the injury arises out of, in connection 
with, or results from: 
(c) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by the failure or 
refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke, any permit, license, certificate, 
approval, order, or similar authorization. 
2
 Plaintiffs settled their claims against David Amodt. 
3
 Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the negligence claims against the individual defendants. 
3 
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Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(c) (West 2008). The District argues that the use of the word 
"any" and the inclusion of the words "approval, order or similar authorization" requires that the 
provision be interpreted broadly and requires a finding of immunity in the instant case. 
Plaintiffs respond that the District's decisions and actions regarding the gun were 
ministerial acts in the course of their day-to-day, internal operations, and did not constitute any 
official act contemplated by U.C.A. § 63G-7-301(5)(c). Plaintiffs further respond that the 
District's interpretation of § 63G-7-301(5)(c) is overly broad and would lead to absurd and 
unintended results. 
The matter was fully briefed and the Court heard oral argument on June 2, 2010. Based 
on the parties' briefing and arguments, this Court has concluded that the question whether 
Section 301(5)(c)'s approval immunity applies to the facts of this case constitutes an issue of 
first impression that has not yet been decided by the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme 
Court last addressed Section 301(5)(c) immunity in Moss v. Pete Suazo Athletic Comm 'n, 2007 
UT 99, 175 P.3d 1042, but left open whether immunity would apply to the facts of this case. For 
that reason this Court seeks the guidance of the Utah Supreme Court. 
Question of Law to Be Answered: 
Because the disposition of the state immunity claim turns on important and unsettled 
questions of Utah law, I certify the following legal question to the Utah Supreme Court: 
Considering the facts discussed above, did the conduct of the school district officials and 
those acting on the school district's behalf constitute the issuance of a "permit, license, 
certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization" under Utah Code Ann. §63G-7-301(5)(c) 
4 
Case 2:09-cv-00565-DB Document 58 Filed 08/09/10 Page 5 of 5 
such that the state actors are entitled to immunity from liability pursuant to the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act? 
Certification of Question of law to the Utah Supreme Court: 
The United States District Court for the District of Utah, on its own motion, submits to 
the Utah Supreme Court a request that the Utah Supreme Court exercise its discretion, pursuant 
to Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to accept the certified question of Utah law 
set forth above. This question is a controlling issue of law in the proceeding before this Court, 
and there appears to be no controlling authority on this precise question of law. This Court 
concludes that certification of this question will further the interests of comity and federalism by 
giving the Utah Supreme Court the opportunity to answer the question in the first instance, 
should it elect to do so. The clerk of this Court shall transmit a copy of this certification order 
and all motions and memoranda filed in conjunction with the District's motion to the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
DATED this 5th day of August, 2010. 
BY THE COURT: 
1)-*^^) *£**£ 
The Honorable Dee Benson 
U.S. District Court Judge 
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